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CONVERGENCE & CONFLICT: REFLECTIONS ON
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS ON HATE SPEECH
Evelyn Aswad** & David Kaye* 1
ABSTRACT—What is hate speech under international human rights
law? And how do key international adjudicators interpret the law governing
it? This Article seeks to illuminate two countervailing and under-reported
trends: on the one hand, a growing consensus among U.N. experts and
treaty bodies concerning interpretations of “hate speech” prohibitions in
international law; and on the other, a failure of several regional human
rights bodies to develop approaches to hate speech that are consistent with
the U.N.’s universal standards. The Article begins by analyzing the U.N.’s
approach to freedom of expression and hate speech and examining how, in
the last decade, various U.N. expert bodies have converged on an agreed
approach to the subject. The Article next compares this global standard
with key developments in the Inter-American, European, and African
human rights systems and the emerging frameworks in Arab, Islamic, and
Southeast Asian contexts. This comparative analysis reveals that, while
certain systems converge with the U.N.’s approach, others diverge,
sometimes marginally, sometimes significantly. For example, the European
Court of Human Rights frequently lessens or removes the burden on
governments to show hate speech restrictions are properly imposed, allows
for the imposition of hate speech restrictions for reasons not accepted at the
global level, and does not assess whether restrictions on speech are the least
intrusive means to achieving legitimate public interest objectives. After
analyzing this landscape of regional norms in convergence and conflict
with U.N. standards, the Article provides several observations. The Article
concludes by urging human rights defenders throughout the world to be
cognizant of the areas in which regional human rights bodies provide fewer
1
**Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law and Director of the Center for International
Business & Human Rights at the University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author would like to
thank her research assistants for their outstanding work: Robert Rembert, Morgan Vastag, Taryn
Chubb, and Maddison Craig.
*Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the International Justice Clinic, University of California
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protections than U.N. standards require, and to tackle this trend through
proposed strategies to protect universal minimum standards for freedom of
expression.
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INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2015 was an unusual one in Germany, tense and
transformative. Chancellor Angela Merkel had declared that Germany
would accept up to one million refugees, the vast majority of whom were
fleeing civil war in Syria.2 In turn, right-wing agitation and violence
increased against refugees and minorities, including those long in
residence, as well as citizens of Germany.3 From the perspective of the
German government, the spread of racism and hate speech on online
platforms, especially Facebook, contributed to discrimination and
violence.4 Heiko Maas, then the German Minister of Justice, demanded that
Facebook take action against hate speech on its platform.5 The demand set
in motion a series of governmental efforts, first to create industry codes of

2
3
4

5
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conduct against hate speech in Europe,6 and ultimately to adopt a German
law that required the largest platforms to take down hate speech and other
content deemed illegal under domestic law – a controversial statute known
as the Network Enforcement Act, or NetzDG.7
This debate triggered basic questions: what is hate speech? How
should it be defined and adjudicated? What type of expression constitutes
hate speech that should be subject to takedowns by companies and
prohibition by the state? Should the law vary according to whether speech
is online or offline? What boundaries on such laws are imposed by human
rights treaties? Even online platforms themselves have turned to
international human rights law to try to answer these knotty questions of
content.8 Indeed, the need for clarity on hate speech law is evident as it is a
topic of global attention, national regulation, political debate, and social
media anxiety.9
6
Id. See also Evelyn Aswad, The Role of U.S. Technology Companies as Enforcers of Europe’s
New Internet Hate Speech Ban, 1 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3-4 (2016) (describing the
main provisions of Europe’s Internet hate speech code of conduct for companies).
7
KAYE, supra note 2, at 67-70. NetzDG required large platforms to “remove content that violated
provisions of German law” within short time frames or face hefty financial penalties. Id. at 68-69.
Human rights watchdogs and companies objected to the law because, inter alia, it inappropriately
privatized the role of courts and public prosecutors with respect to speech adjudication matters and
created problematic incentives for companies to remove speech without “any countervailing pressure to
keep legitimate content up.” Id. at 69-70. Typically, hate speech adjudications by public authorities
require much more time consuming and careful review and deliberation. See JACOB MCHANGAMA ET
AL., FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH PROJECT, RUSHING TO JUDGMENT: ARE SHORT MANDATORY TAKEDOWN
LIMITS FOR ONLINE HATE SPEECH COMPATIBLE WITH THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 17-30 (2021),
https://futurefreespeech.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/FFS_Rushing-to-Judgment-3.pdf (comparing
state-mandated timeframes for platforms to remove online hate speech with the average time that public
authorities utilize in speech adjudication proceedings). Eventually, the NetzDG law served as a template
for authoritarian regimes to suppress online speech. See Jacob Mchangama & Joelle Fiss, Germany’s
Online Crackdowns Inspire the World’s Dictators, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 6, 2019), https://foreign
policy.com/2019/11/06/germany-online-crackdowns-inspired-the-worlds-dictators-russia-venezuelaindia.
8
See, e.g., FACEBOOK [META], CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (2021),
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Facebooks-Corporate-Human-Rights-Policy.pdf
(noting that Facebook is “committed to respecting human rights as set out in the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”) [hereinafter FACEBOOK, CORPORATE HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY]; Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/jack/
status/1027962500438843397 [https://perma.cc/A297-PPMA] (setting forth the view of Twitter’s CEO
that his company should ground its values in international human rights law).
9
See, e.g., United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, UNITED NATIONS, https://
www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/hate-speech-strategy.shtml (2019) (noting the U.N. Secretary
General launched a strategic plan to tackle “alarming trends” in the growth of hate speech and
intolerance); Gilad Edelman, The Parler Bans Open a New Front in the ‘Free Speech’ Wars, WIRED
(Jan. 13, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/parler-bans-new-chapter-free-speech-wars
(observing that the ban on Parler for failing to tackle hate speech “opens a new front in the online
speech wars”); Mathieu Rosemain, Twitter Loses Online Hate Speech Court Battle in France, REUTERS
(Jan. 20, 2022, 8:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/twitter-loses-appeal-french-case-over-
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International human rights law standards have converged around
certain common approaches to hate speech. Consider, for instance, the key
interpretations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”),10 and the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, which monitors implementation of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(“ICERD”).11 Both treaty bodies have found that hate speech prohibitions
must adhere to a test that, inter alia, forbids vague speech bans and requires
that restrictions reflect the least intrusive means to further legitimate public
interest objectives.12 These U.N. treaty bodies, along with expert opinions
offered within the U.N. system, have developed an increasingly consistent
set of rules governing the appropriate boundaries for hate speech laws. 13
Regional human rights institutions have not always followed the lead
of the U.N. interpretations. Some nations even seek at times to justify their
violations of U.N. treaty obligations on freedom of expression by invoking
regional human rights norms rather than adhering to the global standards
that are also binding on them. For example, the European human rights
system, though generally reinforcing global human rights, departs from
international standards in ways that implicate hate speech law.14
online-hate-speech-source-2022-01-20 (reporting that a French court has required Twitter to reveal how
it addresses hate speech on its platform and observing this decision “provides ammunition to
campaigners elsewhere in Europe who want tougher controls to prevent the spread” of hate speech
online).
10
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 28, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 29 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee, which is composed of
independent experts elected by State Parties and provides guidance by (1) producing recommended
interpretations of various provisions (known as General Comments), (2) reviewing periodic reports of
State Parties and publishing its observations and conclusions on implementation matters, and (3) issuing
decisions with respect to individual complaints when State Parties have consented to this procedure. Id.
arts. 28-40. See also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
(describing the Committee’s competency over individual complaints for states that have ratified the
Protocol to the ICCPR).
11
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, arts. 8-13,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, S. Exec. Doc. C. 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD]. ICERD created a Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination that produces guidance to the treaty’s State Parties by issuing (1) recommended
interpretations of the treaty (known as General Recommendations), (2) periodic observations to State
Parties about their implementation of the treaty, and (3) decisions in individual complaints against State
Parties that have recognized the Committee’s competence in this regard. Id. arts. 8-15.
12
See infra Part I(C) (analyzing the scope and application of this principled test).
13
See infra Part I(C).
14
See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
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Germany’s NetzDG law reinforced its national hate speech laws that
prohibit denigration of religions and the denial of historic atrocities –
speech that is protected in the U.N. system but that European institutions
have found can be criminalized under regional standards.15 When
challenged in a U.N. inquiry, Germany defended its legislation, in part, by
invoking European rather than U.N. human rights standards.16
In the same vein, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an
inter-governmental body with 57 member states,17 recently updated its
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,18 and justified its departures
from U.N. standards by citing to European case law. According to the
updated Declaration, speech that offends religious sensibilities or may
display religious intolerance should not be protected speech,19 conflicting
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 26-27, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019), [hereinafter
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA] (observing that the European Court of Human Rights
departs from U.N. standards by, among other things, permitting bans on blasphemy and genocide
denial, determining frequently that hate speech cases are inadmissible as an abuse of freedom of
expression, and deferring significantly to governments). See also infra notes 236-58 and accompanying
text for a summary of key divergences between the U.N. and European systems with respect to hate
speech.
15
Evelyn Aswad, Are Recent Governmental Initiatives to Combat Online Hate Speech, Extremism,
and Fraudulent News Consistent with the International Human Rights Law Regime? in GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION FOR A CONNECTED WORLD: PROTECTING FREE EXPRESSION, DIVERSITY AND CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECOSYSTEM 29, 30-33 (2018), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/documents/Stanford%20Special%20Report%20web.pdf (noting the NetzDG law requires
social media companies take action against a range of speech criminalized under German law, including
denigration of religious faiths and denial of facts related to the Nazi era, and comparing such bans to
U.N. and European human rights standards).
16
See Letter from the Federal Government of Germany, Answers to the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression in Regard to the Act to
Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act) 2-3, (June 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/95YG-MKAK. Specifically, the German government’s response implied that
protections under the European Convention on Human Rights would be sufficient to meet its freedom
of expression obligations under U.N. treaties. See id. at 2 (“Since the German Constitution and the
European Convention on Human Rights protect freedom of expression, there will also be effective
remedies for anyone wishing to challenge any actions based on the new law.”). In addition, the German
government invoked the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, which allows for broad bans
on hate speech, in justifying its new law. Id. at 3 (“Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights in its
case-law has made abundantly clear that hate speech is intolerable in a democratic society.”).
17
History, OIC, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited Feb. 20,
2022) [hereinafter OIC History] (commemorating the organization’s membership and noting that it is
the second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations).
18
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted Nov. 28, 2020, OIC-IPHRC, http://
oic-iphrc.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/FINAL%20OHRD%20CLEAN%20%20VERSION%2024_12_
2020.pdf [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
19
Id. art. 21(c) (“Freedom of expression should not be used for denigration of religions and
prophets or to violate the sanctities of religious symbols”). Prior to the adoption of the revised
declaration, the OIC’s Human Rights Commission had made clear that “sheer disrespect, defamation,
insult, and negative stereotyping” constitute “incite[ment of] religious hatred” and would not be
protected speech. Indep.
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with U.N. standards that protect speech such as blasphemy. 20 The OIC’s
Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (OIC-IPHRC) praised
the European Court of Human Rights’ reluctance to prohibit the
criminalization of blasphemy, or speech that offends religious sensibilities
or displays religious intolerance.21
Such instances of resorting to regional jurisprudence to rationalize
providing fewer human rights protections than those embodied in global
standards are problematic for a variety of reasons. First, as a matter of
established treaty law, “regional human rights norms cannot, in any event,
be invoked to justify departure from international human rights
protections.”22 In other words, violating the minimum standards in U.N.
human rights treaties cannot be legally justified by citing to differing
regional norms. Second, the divergence between global and regional norms
on hate speech often causes inappropriate conflation of, and confusion
about, the relevant standards, which can lead to concerns that international

Permanent Hum. Rts. Comm. [IPHRC], 8th Session: Outcome Document of the Thematic Debate on
‘Freedom of Expression’ and ‘Hate Speech’, at 1 (Nov. 23, 2015), https://oic-iphrc.org/en/data/docs/
session_reports/8th/8th_iphrc_thematic_debate_outcome_en.pdf.
20
See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (describing the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s
approach to blasphemy).
21
On the Occasion of ‘International Human Rights Day’ IPHRC Welcomes the Adoption of ‘Cairo
Declaration of the OIC on Human Rights’ and Calls upon Member States to Apply Human Rights
Based Approaches in Dealing with the Socio-Economic and Health Related Challenges of COVID-19
Pandemic, OIC-IPHRC, (Dec. 10, 2020), https://oic-iphrc.org/home/article/479 (“the Commission
recalled and reaffirmed . . . the jurisprudence emerging from the European Court of Human Rights,
which validates restrictions on freedom of expression criticizing religious beliefs where such expression
constitutes incitement to hatred and is deemed offensive to the adherents of a particular religion.”). The
European Court has found that restricting speech to avoid offending religious sensibilities is a
legitimate governmental objective. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
22
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 26 (emphasis added). Under the
rules for treaty interpretation that are set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
regional human rights treaties would not qualify as sources that define the scope of global treaties. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2)-(3), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (noting that only treaties that all parties to original
treaty have endorsed as defining the scope of the original treaty are appropriate sources of
interpretation). Given that regional human rights treaties have not been endorsed by all the parties to
U.N. human rights treaties, such regional treaties do not define the scope of global treaty obligations.
Indeed, it would undermine the point of global treaties and certainty in multilateral treaty relations if a
regional group could develop its own treaty that changed the scope of a global treaty’s obligations. If
resort is made to regional treaties and their relevant jurisprudence to learn lessons when examining the
scope of global treaties, great care should be taken when making such comparative assessments. See
Gerald Neuman, The Draft General Comment on Freedom of Assembly: Might Less Be More, JUST
SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68465/the-draft-general-comment-on-freedomof-assembly-might-less-be-more/ (urging the U.N. Human Rights Committee “to demonstrate its
commitment to conscientiously interpreting its own global Covenant” rather than relying on regional
jurisprudence without examination of relevant differences between global and regional approaches and
treaties).
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law provides little guidance to states or online platforms seeking to regulate
hateful speech.23 Third, these normative divergences on hate speech allow
governments to couch their challenges to universal norms by citing to
regional jurisprudence, rather than more openly acknowledging that their
challenge is based on domestic law approaches. In essence, the use of
regional jurisprudence to justify violating U.N. norms may at times be a
contemporary manifestation of a persistent challenge to the universal
human rights project: the invocation of cultural relativism to legitimize the
failure to implement global minimum standards.
This cocktail of considerations creates conditions that can eventually
erode global human rights standards, which makes this a liminal moment to
examine how U.N. and regional standards converge and conflict with
regard to hate speech, to reflect on the potential impacts of normative
divergences, and to develop ways forward. Part I of this Article assesses
how key components of the U.N.’s human rights machinery have
converged in their approach to both discretionary and mandatory hate
speech bans. Part II examines how regional human rights systems in
Europe, the Americas, and Africa approach freedom of expression and hate
speech. This Part also notes emergent conflicts with normative frameworks
in the new and weakly-institutionalized approaches of the Arab region, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation. Part III begins by extrapolating from this mapping exercise
how regional approaches converge and conflict with U.N. standards. It
highlights that the European human rights system in particular departs from
the U.N.’s minimum protections for freedom of expression, which not only
challenges the U.N. system but also can (adversely) influence the
development of other regional freedom of expression norms. This Part next
provides recommendations about how human rights defenders can
reinforce U.N. approaches to hate speech, which are grounded in principled
measures for both protecting speech and tackling intolerance.24
23

See Evelyn Mary Aswad, To Protect Freedom of Expression, Why Not Steal Victory from the
Jaws of Defeat?, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609, 614-43 (2020) (describing how scholars and lawyers
have conflated global and regional norms to conclude that international law provides conflicting and
insufficient guidance on freedom of expression issues, including hate speech).
24
Our reference to “human rights defenders” intends to be addressed not only to national and
regional civil society actors but also lawyers, independent experts in the regional and U.N. human rights
environments, and others working to defend freedom of expression norms and to protect individuals and
communities against the discrimination, hostility, and violence that ICCPR Article 20(2) seeks to
address. See infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text for an analysis of ICCPR Article 20. Hate speech
prohibitions that go beyond those authorized by U.N. standards have not been shown to effectively
promote human rights, including with respect to equality and non-discrimination, but rather often
undermine them. See generally NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE
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I.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE
SPEECH

The freedom of expression as a human right under international law
centers on two foundational instruments established under the umbrella of
the United Nations: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). The UDHR provides, “Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”25 Like all the rights in the
UDHR, the freedom of expression may be restricted under certain limited
circumstances.26 The ICCPR refined and codified this standard.27 Part I
analyzes U.N. standards on freedom of expression and hate speech,
focusing on the ICCPR and the authoritative interpretations that have
developed around it. It begins by examining the ICCPR’s standard of broad
protection for freedom of expression as well as its requirement that any
speech restrictions comply with a three-part test of legality, necessity and
legitimacy. It next analyzes the scope of mandatory hate speech bans under
the ICCPR and ICERD as well as how these mandatory bans intersect with
the ICCPR’s test for speech restrictions. Part I concludes that key human
rights bodies within the U.N. system have largely converged in their
approach to hate speech.
A. Protection of Speech and Permissible Restrictions
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR provides: “Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.”28 This broad protection for freedom of expression explicitly
covers both the ability to “impart” and to “receive” all kinds and all forms
of expression, encompassing the rights of speakers and audiences. ICCPR
SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 133-82 (2018) (explaining how censorship is ineffective and often
counterproductive in tackling intolerance and why non-censorial methods are more effective in
combating hate and intolerance).
25
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
26
Any limitation on UDHR rights must be “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” Id. art. 29(2).
27
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19. See Part I(A) for a discussion of ICCPR art. 19.
28
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19(2) (emphasis added).
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Article 19(3) acknowledges that limitations on expression may be
permitted, but subjects them to a strict three-part test.29 The government
bears the burden of proving that any restriction on expression is (1)
provided by law and (2) necessary (3) for a legitimate public interest
objective.30 This tripartite test is often referred to as the cumulative
conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy.31 The U.N. human rights
machinery has made clear that states should apply this test both when
adopting legislation and applying laws that restrict speech to particular
situations.32
In 2011, after multi-year deliberations, the Human Rights Committee
produced interpretive guidance on Article 19, in General Comment 34.33 Its
lead drafter noted that General Comment 34 reflects an evolution of the
Committee’s approach by broadening its interpretations of the scope of
freedom of expression and providing “in the most elaborated fashion” to
date its views on the tripartite test.34 General Comment 34 emphasizes that
this three-part test applies to all state restrictions on speech35 and that states
bear the burden of demonstrating their lawfulness.36 Moreover, states “must
demonstrate in a specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of
the threat . . . [including] by establishing a direct and immediate connection
between the expression and the threat.”37

29

Id. art. 19(3) (providing that the government “may” rather than “must” restrict speech).
Id. art. 19(3); U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, ¶¶ 27, 35, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
31
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/71/373 (Sept. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Special
Rapporteur 2016 Report to UNGA].
32
See, e.g., Irene Khan et al., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, Comments on the Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code,
2021, OL IND 8/2021 (June 11, 2021), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoad
PublicCommunicationFile?gId=26385 (expressing concern about the violation of freedom of expression
standards with regard to legal regulations); Irene Khan et al., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Freedom of Opinion and Expression Joint Allegation Letter to Bahrain, AL BHR
3/2021 (Sept. 16, 2021), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicComm
unicationFile?gId=26630 (expressing concern about the violation of freedom of expression obligations
with respect to the treatment of a particular individual).
33
Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
627, 645-53 (2012) (describing the process that was used to adopt General Comment No. 34).
34
Id. at 647-53.
35
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶¶ 50-52.
36
Id. ¶ 27.
37
Id. ¶ 35.
30
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1. Legality
The Human Rights Committee has stated that any restriction on
speech, in order to be “provided by law,” must not be improperly vague.38
Restrictions on speech must give appropriate notice to the public of what
speech is banned while appropriately constraining the discretion of
governmental authorities.39 Further, any law restricting speech must be
properly enacted within a country’s domestic legal system. 40 The legality
prong also encompasses a ban on overly broad restrictions (i.e., restrictions
that cover more speech than needed), requires that restrictions be subject to
public comment, and implies that independent judicial officials must
oversee the implementation of speech restrictions.41
2. Legitimacy
Any restriction on expression must be designed to protect a legitimate,
enumerated objective set forth in ICCPR Article 19(3): the protection of the
rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, public health
or morals.42 The Human Rights Committee has sought to constrain these
potentially open-ended grounds for speech restrictions. For instance, the
Committee explained that the purpose of protecting public morals should
not be based exclusively on a “single tradition” and must be interpreted “in
the light of the universality of human rights” and non-discrimination
principles.43 It has criticized governmental invocations of public interest
objectives that serve as pretexts for illegitimate interests.44 The Committee
has emphasized that governments may not invoke additional grounds
beyond those enumerated in Article 19(3) to justify speech restrictions.45
38

Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
40
Id. ¶ 24; Special Rapporteur 2016 Report to UNGA, supra note 31, ¶ 12.
41
Special Rapporteur 2016 Report to UNGA, supra note 31, ¶¶ 12, 13; David Kaye, (Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep.
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35, ¶ 7 (Apr. 6, 2018); Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA,
supra note 14, ¶ 6(a).
42
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 19(3).
43
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 32. U.N. human
rights monitors have implemented this guidance with respect to various laws in different regions. See,
e.g., Letter of U.N. Special Rapporteurs to the Government of Lebanon, AL LBN 3/2019 (May 10,
2019), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=245
60 (criticizing government blocking of the largely gay dating app, Grindr as an improper invocation of
morals); Letter of U.N. Special Rapporteurs to the Government of Ghana, OL GHA 3/2021 (Aug. 9,
2021), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=265
86 (criticizing Ghanaian legislation seeking to limit activities of individuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation as “not in keeping with the proper definition of ‘public morals.’”).
44
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 30.
45
Id. ¶ 22.
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3. Necessity
Limitations on speech must also, among other things, be (1) the least
intrusive means to achieve the legitimate objective and (2) proportionate to
the interest to be protected.46 A three-prong approach can assist in assessing
whether a speech restriction qualifies as the least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate objective.47 First, the state should assess if it has or can
create any non-censorial methods to achieve the goal. For example,
governments have the ability to engage in a variety of measures to combat
intolerance that do not burden speech. They can, inter alia, implement laws
prohibiting acts of discrimination, deploy high level governmental officials
to speak out against intolerance, and train governmental officials to prevent
discriminatory profiling and other practices. If such avenues are sufficient
to combat intolerance, then restricting speech is not the least intrusive
means.48 Second, if methods that do not burden speech are insufficient, then
the state should rank its available speech-restricting tools and select the one
that least burdens freedom of expression, paying particular attention to the
right of the speaker to speak and of listeners to hear the speaker’s views.49
This involves assessing, among other things, a range of civil and criminal
penalties and demonstrating selection of the least intrusive means. Third,
the state should also demonstrate through transparent, evidence-based
reasoning that the restriction serves to achieve the legitimate objective.50 If
restrictions are ineffective or counterproductive, then they cannot meet the
test of necessity.51
46

Id. ¶ 34.
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 52.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See id. U.N. monitors have frequently asserted that states should provide justifications that are
evidence-based when restricting speech. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Third Party Intervention filed in the European
Court of Human Rights, ¶ 20 (June 3, 2019), Microsoft Word - Big Brother Watch draft DK final
look.docx (ohchr.org), (“States regularly invoke national security to legitimise surveillance measures
that entail over-broad restrictions on human rights. The invocation of national security does not in and
of itself provide an adequate human rights law justification. Rather, the State must provide an
‘articulable and evidence based justification for the interference’. The State must, at a minimum, give a
meaningful public account of the tangible benefits.”); David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Research Paper 1/2019
on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, at 11 (June 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Opinion/ElectionsReportDigitalAge.pdf (“approaches for combating disinformation
should be evidence-based and tailored to proven or documented impacts of disinformation or
propaganda.”); Joint Declaration of Freedom of Expression Mandate Holders on Freedom of Expression
and Countering Violent Extremism (May 4, 2016), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/9/237966.
pdf (“. . . [h]ighlighting that . . . programmes and initiatives that restrict freedom of expression must be
based on evidence of their effectiveness . . .”).
51
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 52.
47
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In keeping with the least-intrusive means standard, the U.N. system
has been working with governments to generate approaches to counter
hatred and intolerance that avoid restrictions on speech. For example, U.N.
Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 achieved consensus on an
approach to tackling religious intolerance that focuses on governments
exercising non-censorial means as a first resort and deploying bans on
speech only when there is “incitement to imminent violence.”52 Such noncensorial means include governments legislating against religious
discrimination and hate crimes, engaging in inter-faith dialogues,
promoting education on tolerance, reaching out to vulnerable populations
to assist with grievances, and having governmental officials speak out
against intolerance.53 Resolution 16/18 underscored that a human rightsbased approach to tackling hate and intolerance means governments
generally should not resort to speech bans before attempting non-restrictive
measures.
The proportionality test, as part of necessity, requires governments to
demonstrate that restrictions “target a specific objective and [do] not
unduly intrude upon the other rights of targeted persons.”54 In addition, the
proportionality assessment also means states restricting speech should
show “[t]he ensuing ‘interference with third parties’ rights [is] limited and
justified in the light of the interest supported by the intrusion.”55 It should
be noted that, while they have aspects that may intersect, the least intrusive
means test and the proportionality test are not the same. The government
must meet its burden under both tests for a speech restriction to survive
scrutiny. The proportionality analysis operates as a double-check on
governments to demonstrate the necessity of speech restrictions by showing
that the benefit to the public interest objective outweighs the burden on
speech and other interests, even if the least intrusive means test is met.
B. The U.N.’s Mandatory Bans on Certain Hate Speech
Mandatory hate speech bans in U.N. human rights treaties are the
principal exception to the normal rule of Article 19(2) guaranteeing
freedom to seek, receive and impart “information and ideas of all kinds.”
52
Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18, ¶ 5(f) (Apr. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter Council Res. 16/18].
53
Id. ¶ 5(a), (b), (e).
54
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression) et al.,
Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression; and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Comm. No. OL
USA 6/2017, 3 (May 9, 2017), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-USA-62017.pdf.
55
Id.
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This section begins by examining ICCPR Article 20’s mandatory ban on
advocacy of hatred that rises to the level of incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence. It next examines ICERD’s ban on racist hate speech.
This section addresses how each of these mandatory bans intersects with
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test, which applies to all speech
restrictions.
1. ICCPR Article 20(2)
Article 20(2) requires the prohibition of “any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence.”56 In 2006, the Human Rights Council requested that
the U.N. Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights produce a
report evaluating the law on “incitement to racial and religious hatred . . .
[and] its implications for” ICCPR Article 20(2).57 The High
Commissioner’s report assessed that there was no consensus among states
about the scope of keywords in Article 20.58 In 2011, after the adoption of
both Resolution 16/18 and the Human Rights Committee’s General
Comment 34, U.N. human rights mechanisms sought to delineate the
appropriate scope of ICCPR Article 20.59
In September 2012, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on freedom of
opinion and expression – appointed by the Human Rights Council to
monitor state compliance with Article 19 and other free speech norms in
international human rights law – noted that a state must demonstrate three
threshold elements for speech to qualify for prohibition under ICCPR
Article 20: intent, incitement, and particular harms.60 First, there must be
56

ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 20.
H.R.C. Dec. 1/107, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/1/107 (June 30, 2006).
58
U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rep. on Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the
Promotion of Tolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6, ¶ 3 (Sept. 20, 2006).
59
It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee has not yet provided comprehensive views
on the substantive scope of ICCPR Article 20. In 1983, it issued a General Comment that focused
primarily on improved reporting in States Parties’ periodic reports. U.N. Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 10, art. 19 (Freedom of Opinion and Expression), 19th Sess. (adopted June 29,
1983). In General Comment 11, adopted one month later, the Human Rights Committee mainly restated
the prohibitions required under Article 20 and urged states to implement them by law. U.N. Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 11, art. 20 (Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting
national, racial or religious hatred), 19th Sess. (adopted July 29, 1983). In 2017, in a decision rendered
as part of its individual complaints process, the Committee found no violation of ICCPR Article 20(2)
when a State Party had adequate laws and procedures to implement this article and had prosecuted but
did not convict a particular speaker. Rabbae v. Netherlands (Hum. Rts. Comm. Commc’n No.
2124/2011), ¶ 10.7 (Mar. 29, 2017).
60
See, e.g., Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/67/357, ¶ 43 (Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur
2012 Report to UNGA].
57
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“advocacy” of national, racial or religious hatred, which means the speaker
has a specific intent to promote hatred towards the target group and does so
publicly.61 Second, the speech must rise to “incitement” against a targeted
group, which means that the statements should “create an imminent risk of
discrimination, hostility or violence against persons belonging to those
groups.”62 In this regard, he noted that “advocacy of hatred . . . is not an
offence in itself” but rather the speech must rise to the level of incitement
to the harms listed in ICCPR Article 20.63 Third, therefore, the incitement
must be directed to producing one of three harmful results: discrimination,
hostility, or violence against the targeted group.64 In acknowledging the
potential ambiguity (and lack of jurisprudence) around “hostility,” the
Special Rapporteur highlighted that this term should be interpreted to mean
“a manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind.” 65
The Special Rapporteur also observed that Article 20 requires
“prohibition” of speech that meets its criteria, a reference to civil
sanctions.66 Criminal sanctions for incitement under Article 20, the Special
Rapporteur found, should be reserved for the most serious and extreme
cases, such as those involving imminent violence.67 In 2011, the Human
Rights Committee stated that restrictions imposed under ICCPR Article 20
must also meet Article 19’s tripartite test.68 The Special Rapporteur has
emphasized that ICCPR Article 20 protects the target of a speaker’s
advocacy of hatred and does not address (or in any way condone or permit)
a target group’s reaction to ‘offensive’ speech with violence.69 There is no
“heckler’s veto” in international human rights law.70
In 2011-2012, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
convened experts from around the world to develop a proposal for

61

Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. ¶ 44.
66
Id. ¶ 47.
67
Id.
68
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶¶ 50-52. For a
discussion of how hate speech bans have fared under the ICCPR Article 19(3) tests of legality,
legitimacy, and necessity, see Part I.C.
69
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 10.
70
Id. A heckler’s veto refers to a situation in which a government restricts speech because of the
potential or actual reactions of those who disagree with the speech. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 133 n.1 (1966). In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted that it had found on three occasions
that peaceful African American protesters had been wrongfully charged under Louisiana’s breach of the
peace statute because of the potential reaction of others and noted how a scholar had coined the phrase
“heckler’s veto” to describe such scenarios. Id.
62
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interpreting ICCPR Article 20(2),71 which culminated in the Rabat Plan of
Action.72 The Rabat recommendations highlighted the importance of using
non-censorial measures as set forth in Resolution 16/18 to deal with
intolerance.73 Recognizing that criminalization should be considered only in
the most serious cases, the Rabat Plan of Action identified six factors that
states should consider when assessing the lawfulness of criminal sanctions:
(1) the social and political context when the speech was made; (2) the
status of the speaker; (3) the intent of the speaker (noting negligence and
recklessness would not suffice); (4) the content and form of the speech; (5)
the reach of the speech; and (6) the likelihood of harm, including its
imminence.74
2. ICERD Article 4
ICERD rests on a premise that racist speech contributes “to creating a
climate of racial hatred and discrimination.”75 It thus bans the dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority and incitement to racial discrimination
and violence. Specifically, with “due regard” for other human rights, it
requires state parties to:
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to
racist activities, including the financing thereof.76

Article 4(a) specifies criminal sanctions for speech that falls within its
terms.77
In 2013, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
issued General Comment 35, interpreting Article 4(a) in a way that
significantly narrowed the breadth one might have taken from its terms
71

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Expert Workshop on the Prohibition of
Incitement to National, Racial, or Religious Hatred, A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, ¶ 1 (Oct. 5, 2012) (Rabat
Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred that Constitutes
Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility, or Violence).
72
Id. app. ¶¶ 1, 6.
73
Id. ¶¶ 23-29, n.4.
74
Id. ¶ 29. The 2019 Special Rapporteur report to the U.N. General Assembly highlighted the
importance of using the Rabat factors in assessing the gravity of various forms of hate speech. See
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 24.
75
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35,
Combatting Racist Hate Speech, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 ¶ 5 (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter CERD,
General Recommendation No. 35].
76
ICERD, supra note 11, art. 4(a) (emphasis added).
77
Id. (requiring State Parties to make certain speech “an offence punishable by law,” which implies
criminalization rather than solely prohibition.)
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only. The Committee took the position that any criminalization of the
“dissemination” of racist ideas or “incitement” to harms should include
three basic elements: intent, incitement, and particular harms,78 similar to
the factors developed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur and the Human
Rights Committee for the interpretation of ICCPR Article 20.79 First,
ICERD found that any Article 4 offense should include an examination of
the speaker’s specific intent, which involves assessing if the speaker “seeks
to influence others to engage in certain forms of conduct . . . through
advocacy or threats.”80 Former ICERD Committee Member (2001-2014),
and lead drafter of General Recommendation 35, Patrick Thornberry has
noted that this interpretation “decisively rejects any suggestion of a ‘strict
liability’ approach to dissemination and incitement . . . [by linking] them
with principles of criminal law on mental elements in crime.”81 Second, the
Committee noted, any speech that is criminalized under Article 4 should
rise to the level of incitement, which it defines as “the imminent risk or
likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result
from the speech.”82 Thornberry has observed that the inclusion of the
concept of imminence narrows “the scope of potential hate speech
prosecutions.”83 Third, with respect to the harms at stake, the text of Article
4(a) itself lists the harms of discrimination and violence with respect to
incitement but sets forth no harms for “dissemination” crimes. In General
Recommendation 35, published in 2013, the Committee expanded the list
of harms to be averted to include incitement to “hatred” or “contempt,”

78
CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 16 (noting that the elements of
incitement should apply to the other offenses punishable pursuant to ICERD Article 4, which includes
the dissemination of ideas based racial superiority or hatred).
79
See Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60 and accompanying text. Though
the ICERD Committee did not cite the Special Rapporteur’s 2012 report in reaching this conclusion, it
did note at the beginning of its General Recommendation that “The Committee has integrated [the] right
to freedom of expression into its work on combating hate speech, commenting where appropriate on its
lack of effective implementation and, where necessary, drawing upon its elaboration in sister human
rights bodies.” CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 4.
80
CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 16.
81
Patrick Thornberry, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: The Prohibition of “Racist Hate Speech,” in THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 121, 131 (Cambridge University Press 2015).
82
CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 16. The Committee further stated that
five contextual factors should be examined before criminalization can be justified for Article 4 offenses:
(1) the content and form of the speech; (2) the economic, social, and political climate; (3) the position
or status of the speaker; (4) the reach of the speech; and (5) the objectives of the speech, which it
adapted from the Rabat Plan of Action. Id. ¶ 15, n.17; CERD General Recommendation No. 35,
Combatting Racist Hate Speech, U.N. Doc. No CERD/C/GC/35/Corr.1 (Feb. 14, 2014) (correcting
General Recommendation No. 35 to say “[f]or paragraph 14 above read paragraph 15 above”).
83
Thornberry, supra note 81, at 132.
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which the Committee did not define.84 However, Thornberry has noted that
such an expansion of harms was tempered by the high thresholds imposed
in other parts of General Recommendation 35, including, with respect to
intent, incitement to imminent harm, and the application of ICCPR Article
19(3) to any speech restrictions imposed under ICERD Article 4(a).85
In addition, General Recommendation 35 “clarified the ‘due regard’
language of ICERD Article 4 to require strict compliance with freedom of
expression guarantees.”86 General Recommendation 35 states that the due
regard clause means the protection of freedom of expression is the “most
pertinent principle when calibrating the legitimacy of speech restrictions.” 87
The ICERD Committee further emphasized that any criminalization of
speech under Article 4 “should be governed by the principles of legality,
proportionality and necessity.”88 Thus, applying the ICCPR Article 19(3)
tripartite tests further constrains the potential scope of ICERD Article 4.
Indeed, the Committee emphasized that criminalization is only justified in
the most serious cases and that expressions of views in academic debates or
as political engagement without incitement to harm even when
controversial should not be limited.89
General Recommendation 35 thus converges with ICCPR Articles
19(3) and 20(2) as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee.90 Since
issuing General Recommendation 35, the ICERD Committee has not had
occasion to adopt substantive views on Article 4(a) through its individual
complaints process. Given the Committee’s prior approach to racist
expression, however, General Recommendation 35 is likely to significantly
impact the Committee’s treatment of hate speech. For example, Thornberry
notes that the Committee’s prior recommendations that discounted intent
84

CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 13 (b), (d).
Thornberry, supra note 81, at 290-91 (“In practice, any implicit widening of the scope of the
offenses to be declared is likely to be countered by the more stringent requirements for the operation of
law set out particularly in paragraphs 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20 and 25” of General Recommendation 35.)
See infra note 88 and accompanying text (noting the ICERD Committee’s view that ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test applies to speech restrictions imposed under ICERD).
86
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 15.
87
CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 19.
88
Id. ¶ 12 (citing to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34).
89
Id. ¶¶ 12, 25.
90
PATRICK THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY 297-98, 301-02 (2016) (“[T]he fresh reading of
Article 4 takes the Convention closer to the ICCPR
Overall, it may be argued that General
Recommendation 35 takes ICERD practice nearer to ‘libertarian’ currents regarding the prosecution of
hate speech crimes; the suggested criminal law requirement of the need for ‘imminence’ of the
consequences of incitement may be more stringent than in many jurisdictions”); Special Rapporteur
2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 15 (noting the ICERD Committee’s “converging
interpretations” with the Human Rights Committee).
85
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and incitement in hate speech cases are no longer “in accord with current
practice as represented by General Recommendation 35.”91 In addition,
before General Recommendation 35, the Committee found violations of
ICERD Article 4 by State Parties without assessing the applicability of the
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s legality or necessity principles,92 which is also no
longer in accord with the Committee’s latest interpretations as set forth in
General Recommendation 35.
In sum, General Recommendation 35 significantly shifts the ICERD
Committee’s approach to hate speech in its most authoritative interpretation
of Article 4 and far-reaching integration of ICCPR Article 19. Since
adopting the General Recommendation, the ICERD Committee requires the
following elements for the criminalization of any speech (including with
respect to dissemination of racial superiority and hatred) under Article 4(a):
(1) the specific intent of the speaker to influence others to engage in certain
conduct; (2) incitement (which is defined as including the imminent risk or
likelihood that the intended conduct will result); and (3) the harms of
discrimination, violence, hatred, or contempt. In addition to holding
“dissemination” to incitement standards and interpreting incitement
standards consistent with the high threshold of imminent harm, the
Committee also assesses any speech bans imposed under ICERD Article 4
for compliance with ICCPR Article 19(3)’s rigorous tripartite test.
C. Application of Tripartite Test to Hate Speech Bans
States may sometimes wish to supplement or substitute an Article 20
argument for banning hate speech with one that rests on assertions that

91
Thornberry, supra note 90, at 294-95. Thornberry refers to the Committee’s 2007 observations
on a Ukrainian periodic report in which the Committee was concerned about the “absence of any
prosecutions” under its law on “incitement to racial discrimination” and it urged relaxation of the intent
standard to “facilitate successful prosecutions.” ICERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Ukraine, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/18, ¶ 9
(Feb. 8, 2007). Similarly, in its periodic reporting process prior to General Recommendation 35, the
Committee was pleased that Cyprus had removed an intent requirement from its criminal ban on
“incitement to racial hatred.” Report of the CERD, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 18, A/56/18, ¶ 262
(2001).
92
See, e.g., ICERD Committee, Adan v. Denmark (Comm’n No. 43/2008), ¶¶ 7.2, 7.7 (Sept. 21,
2010) (finding a violation of Article 4 without assessing whether the relevant law passed legality and
necessity conditions–when Denmark “fail[ed] to carry out an effective investigation” into alleged
violations of a law that “criminalize[d] public statements by which a group of people are threatened,
insulted or degraded on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religion or sexual
inclination”); ICERD Committee, Jewish Community of Oslo v. Norway (Comm’n No. 30/2003), ¶¶
2.5, 10.5 (Aug. 22, 2005) (finding a violation of Article 4–without applying legality and necessity
principles–when a conviction had been reversed under a law that restricted “threat[s], insult[s], or
subjecting to hatred, persecution or contempt, any person or group of persons because of their creed,
race, color or national or ethnic origin”).
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particular speech poses a threat to public order or to the rights of others,
legitimate grounds for restriction under Article 19(3). Under the ICCPR,
whether the basis for restricting speech is the mandatory prohibition under
Article 20 or discretionary prohibition under Article 19, states may restrict
such hate speech only if they can demonstrate that the restriction meets
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite tests of legality, legitimacy, and
necessity.93 U.N. experts have often determined that hate speech laws –
whether imposed under obligations to ban hateful speech or as a matter of
discretion – fail to meet at least one of these tests.
For instance, laws banning the spread of hateful, divisive, and/or racist
views are often inappropriately vague. U.N. monitors have criticized
Mauritanian hate speech laws for containing unduly vague prohibitions on
speech that (1) has a “racist nature”; (2) “supports or communicates terms
that could reveal an intention to leave or incite to hurt morally or
physically, promote or incite to hatred”; or (3) “incites discrimination,
hatred or violence, defamation and insult on the grounds of origin or
belonging racial, ethnic, nationality
”94 Laws restricting the creation of
hatred, discord, or animosity have similarly suffered from vagueness
concerns. For instance, in his 2012 report to the U.N. General Assembly,
the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression noted that bans on
“causing national, racial, or religious discord and intolerance,” the
“expression of feelings of hostility,” and “exciting racial hostility” would
be improperly vague.95 Malaysian hate speech laws outlawing expression
that “conjures feelings of ‘hatred,’ ‘contempt,’ ‘disaffection,’ ‘discontent,’
‘ill will,’ or ‘hostility’” fail the clarity test.96 Moreover, U.N. experts have
highlighted that vague hate speech bans “are in fact used to suppress
critical and opposing voices” and in Somalia, for example, were used to
detain journalists.97 Ethiopia’s 2020 criminalization of expression “that
deliberately promotes hatred, discrimination or attack against a person or a
discernable group of identity, based on ethnicity, religion, race, gender or

93

U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶¶ 50-52.
David Kaye et al. (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression),
Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and of Expression, Comm. No. MRT 5/2017, 8 (Jan. 24, 2018), www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-MRT-5-2017.pdf.
95
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶ 51.
96
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Mandate
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Comm. No. OL MYS 6/2018, 3 (Dec. 28, 2018), https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TM
ResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24287.
97
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶ 51 (highlighting misuse of hate
speech laws in Somalia “to arrest and detain independent journalists”).
94
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disability” involved “a serious risk that the law may be used to silence
critics.”98
As part of the U.N.’s pivot towards increasingly protective approaches
to freedom of expression, the Human Rights Committee emphasized in
General Comment 34 that certain governmental objectives do not meet
ICCPR Article 19’s “legitimacy” test. For example, the Committee stated
that prohibiting expression that denies historic facts is not a legitimate
reason to burden speech.99 As noted by General Comment 34’s lead drafter,
this position represented a purposeful reversal of the approach the
Committee had taken in a prior matter.100 The Committee did note that any
limitations on speech on the denial of historic facts should comply with
ICCPR Articles 19 and 20, which indicates that governments may prohibit
expression that denies historic facts, but only when such speech constitutes
advocacy of incitement to particular harms. Similarly, in General
Recommendation 35, the ICERD Committee emphasized that “the
expression of opinions about historical facts” should not be banned,101 and
should be criminalized only where it rises to the level of incitement. 102
The Human Rights Committee has also made clear that laws that have
the objective of mandating respect for religion or religious leaders are not
acceptable governmental goals.103 As noted by one of the authors, “antiblasphemy laws fail to meet the legitimacy condition of Article 19(3),
given that Article 19 protects individuals and their rights to freedom of
expression and opinion; neither it nor Article 18 of the ICCPR protect ideas
or beliefs from ridicule, abuse, criticism or other ‘attacks’ seen as
offensive.”104 That said, if the blasphemous speech is part of advocacy of
religious hatred that rises to the level of incitement to violence,
discrimination, or hostility against that group, then it would be subject to
98
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression: Visit to Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. No A/HRC/44/49/Add.1, ¶¶ 33-34 (Apr. 29, 2020).
99
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 49:
Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the
obligations that the Covenant imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of
opinion and expression. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an
erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.
100
O’Flaherty, supra note 33, at 653 (referring to HRC, Faurisson v. France (Communication no.
550/1993), 16 December 1996, § 9.5). In Faurisson, France had convicted a man under the Gayssot Act
for disagreeing with the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The
Committee had upheld that conviction under ICCPR Article 19. Id.
101
CERD General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 75, ¶ 14 (citing to U.N. Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 49).
102 Id.
103
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 48.
104
Special Rapporteur 2019 Report to UNGA, supra note 14, ¶ 21.

184

20:165 (2022)

Convergence & Conflict

prohibition under ICCPR Article 20 (assuming compliance with Article
19(3)’s three-part test).105
With respect to the necessity test, U.N. mechanisms have advocated
that non-censorial methods to combat hate speech should be considered,
consistent with the approach embodied in Resolution 16/18.106 Where such
measures are insufficient, a government should assess its range of options
that burden speech and select the least intrusive means to achieve its
legitimate purpose (such as the rights of others or public order).107
International human rights law underscores the importance of
demonstrating a likely near-term (i.e., imminent) harm to justify a speech
restriction as the least intrusive means for achieving a legitimate
objective.108 U.N. monitors often admonish states for neglecting the
incitement standard and its various contextual factors, including the
likelihood of imminent harm, when imposing hate speech bans.109 In
addition, the global human rights framework’s requirement that the
intention of the speaker to cause particular harm be examined constitutes a
further and substantial threshold in restricting hate speech.110 Given the
Special Rapporteur’s understandings of the thresholds implicit in
incitement that were described above,111 the least intrusive means test
compels the state to approach the imposition of hate speech bans in a
disciplined and calibrated manner.

105

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 18-24 (“The recognition of steps other than legal prohibitions highlights that prohibition
will often not be the least restrictive measure available to States confronting hate speech problems.”);
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶¶ 62-64.
107
See supra notes 46-51 (describing ICCPR Article 19(3)’s least intrusive means test).
108
Frank LaRue (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, U.N. Doc. No A/68/362, §§ 52, 53 (Sept. 4, 2013):
For a restriction to be necessary, it must . . . not be more restrictive than is required for the
achievement of the desired purpose or protected right
[T]he authorities must demonstrate, in
specific and individualized fashion, the precise nature of the imminent threat, as well as the
necessity for and the proportionality of the specific action taken. A direct and immediate connection
between the expression (or the information to be disclosed) and the alleged threat must be
established.
109
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶ 79.
110
Id. ¶ 50 (citing a 2001 joint statement with the freedom of expression experts from the
Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) (“No
one should be penalized for the dissemination of hate speech unless it has been shown that they did so
with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence”).
111
See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (requiring speakers display a specific intent to
cause harm, defining incitement as creating an imminent risk of harm, and viewing hostility as “a
manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind”).
106
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II. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS ON EXPRESSION AND HATE
SPEECH
Although the U.N.’s global human rights framework has converged
around an interpretation of those provisions protecting and promoting
freedom of expression while also requiring prohibitions of ‘hate speech,’
regional jurisprudence has not always arrived at the same conclusions. Part
II examines areas of convergence and conflict, paying particular attention
to the central regional institutions that have developed legal instruments
and jurisprudence around the freedom of expression. The most prolific
regional jurisprudence on hate speech derives from the European Court of
Human Rights. The courts within the American and African systems do not
have substantial jurisprudence on hate speech and thus our analysis of those
regional approaches is often based on interpretations by authoritative expert
(but not court) entities within those systems. As the European, American,
and African approaches are the most developed regional human rights
systems, we devote the most attention to the central human rights treaties in
those regions.
In particular, Part II highlights how the European Court of Human
Rights has alleviated the burden on governments to justify speech
restrictions in a variety of ways that provide fewer protections for freedom
of expression than the U.N. system.112 We note how this body of European
case law is frequently relied upon by other regional mechanisms, which
risks leading other regions to depart from the U.N.’s minimum human
rights protections.113 In addition, this Part identifies unfolding conflicts with
the U.N.’s standards in the emergent, weakly-institutionalized approaches
of the Middle East, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the OIC.114 Again, we find the European Court’s jurisprudence invoked
by one of these evolving approaches (the OIC) to justify providing fewer
protections for freedom of expression than what is afforded under global
standards.115
A. The Inter-American Human Rights System
The American Convention on Human Rights was opened for signature
in 1969, entered into force in 1978, and currently has twenty-five state

112

See infra notes 138-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the European system.
See, e.g., infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text (describing how the African Court has
adopted certain approaches from the European Court that depart from U.N. standards).
114
See infra Part II(D) and accompanying text.
115
See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
113
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parties.116 The American Convention provides for broad protections for
freedom of expression, including an explicit prohibition on prior
censorship.117 In terms very similar to ICCPR Article 19, American
Convention Article 13 protects the “freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s
choice.”118 Governments may not restrict freedom of expression via prior
censorship, but may restrict it through “subsequent imposition of liability”
when (1) “expressly established by law” and (2) necessary (3) “to ensure”
“(a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (b) the protection of
national security, public order, or public health or morals.”119 The InterAmerican system has a presumption in favor of speech and places the
burden on the government to demonstrate that any hate speech ban satisfies
its strict conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy when restricting
hate speech.120
The Inter-American Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
(IACHR Special Rapporteur), whose findings carry significant weight
within the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, is based on the
American Convention and has synthesized relevant interpretations of the
three-part tests of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in a manner that
converges in material respects with the U.N.’s approach. Specifically,
limitations on speech must be defined in a precise and clear manner by a
law,121 and the limitation must serve “compelling” objectives set forth in the

116
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; Signatories and Current
Status of Ratifications, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/Basic4.
Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
117
American Convention, supra note 116, arts. 13(1)-(2). Prior censorship refers to governmental
suppression of speech before it can be disseminated to the public. Prior Censorship, THE ORG. OF AM.
STATES, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=152&lID=1 (describing InterAmerican human rights bodies’ interpretation of Article 13’s prohibition of prior censorship).
118
American Convention, supra note 116, art. 13(1).
119
Id. art. 13(2). It should be noted that a subsequent provision does temper the prohibition on
prior censorship in limited circumstances. Id. art. 13(4) (“public entertainments may be subject by law
to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of
childhood and adolescence.”).
120
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., The Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, ¶ 68, OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09 (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.oas.
org/en/iachr/expression/docs/publications/INTER-AMERICAN%20LEGAL%20FRAMEWORK%
20OF%20THE%20RIGHT%20TO%20FREEDOM%20OF%20EXPRESSION%20FINAL%20PORTA
DA.pdf (“It is incumbent upon the authority imposing the limitations to prove that these conditions
have been met. Furthermore, all of the stated conditions must be met simultaneously in order for the
limitations to be legitimate pursuant to the American Convention”).
121
Id. ¶¶ 69-70:
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American Convention.122 Indeed, “necessary” is not synonymous with
“useful,” “reasonable,” or “convenient.”123 Rather, to meet the necessity
test, states must demonstrate they have selected the least restrictive means
of achieving the public interest objective.124 In addition, states must show
the speech restriction is “strictly proportionate” to the objective pursued,
which involves an assessment of “whether the sacrifice of freedom of
expression . . . is excessive in relation to the advantages obtained through
such measure.”125 With respect to any speech restriction, the burden is on
“the authority imposing limitations to prove that these conditions have been
met.”126
Of the regional human rights systems, only the Inter-American system
has a mandatory requirement to criminalize certain hate speech in its
foundational human rights instrument. American Convention Article 13(5),
with language similar to ICCPR Article 20, requires that “any advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute[s] incitements to lawless
violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of
persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language,
or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.” 127 For
speech to rise to this level, the expression therefore must contain several
elements: (1) advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that rises to
the level of (2) incitement to (3) lawless violence or similar harm (4)
against any person or group.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has not yet
opined on the scope of Article 13(5). However, the IACHR Special
Rapporteur has assessed its meaning. With respect to the intent element, the
Every limitation to freedom of expression must be established in advance, expressly, restrictively
and clearly in a law
The laws that set limits to freedom of expression must be drafted in the
clearest and most specific terms possible, as the legal framework must provide legal certainty to the
public.
The Inter-American Special Rapporteur has noted the chilling effect of vague speech bans as well as the
inappropriate discretion they grant to governmental enforcers. Id. ¶ 71 (“Vague, ambiguous, broad or
open-ended laws, by their mere existence, discourage the dissemination of information and opinions out
of fear of punishment, and can lead to broad judicial interpretations that unduly restrict freedom of
expression”).
122
Id. ¶ 74 (“[R]estrictions imposed must pursue one of the limited compelling objectives set forth
in the American Convention”).
123
Id. ¶ 85.
124
Id. ¶ 86 (“[A]mong the various options available for reaching the same objective, the State
should choose the one that least restricts [freedom of expression]”). The state must also show that the
restriction is a measure that is “effectively conducive to attaining the legitimate and compelling
objectives in question.” Id. ¶ 87.
125
Id. ¶ 88.
126
Id. ¶ 68.
127
American Convention, supra note 116, art. 13(5) (emphasis added).
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IACHR Special Rapporteur found that there must be advocacy of hatred
against a particular group, requiring evidence that the speaker had the
intention and capacity to engage in an unlawful act.128 In other words, the
speaker must not just intend to speak, but instead must specifically intend
for harm to occur and must have the capacity to create or incite harm. The
Inter-American Special Rapporteur has also observed that, because the
phrasing of the treaty provision covers harm to groups beyond those based
on nationality, race, and religion, the targeting of unlisted groups such as
“individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity, or
bodily diversity” would also be covered by this provision. 129
In addition, the speech must rise to the level of “incitement.” The
Inter-American Special Rapporteur explained that this means it is
impermissible to limit freedom of expression based on “mere conjectures
about eventual effects on order, nor hypothetical circumstances derived
from subjective interpretations by authorities of facts.”130 Instead, the state
must demonstrate facts that “clearly present a present, certain, objective,
and imminent risk of violence.”131 With regard to the types of harms that are
targeted in this provision, the advocacy of incitement must be directed to
producing “lawless violence” or “similar [illegal] action.”132 Though the
scope of “similar action” is not defined, the phrasing indicates the harm
should have the same severity as violence. In comparison to the U.N.
system, the American Convention shares similar intent and incitement
standards, but the types of harm appear broader in ICCPR Article 20.133
When hateful speech does not rise to the level of American
Convention Article 13(5), the Inter-American system provides that such
speech may be restricted, but only if (1) its three-part test of legality,
legitimacy, and necessity is satisfied, and (2) the burden on speech takes
128
Catalina Botero Marino (Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Special Rapporteur for freedom of
expression), Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51, ¶ 544 (Dec. 20,
2009), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/annual/Informe%20Anual%202009%202%
20ENG.pdf [hereinafter Botero 2009 Report] (“these must have as a prerequisite strong, objective
evidence that the person was not simply expressing an opinion, but also had the clear intention to
commit an unlawful act and the real, present, and effective possibility of achieving his or her
objectives.”).
129
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence Against Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons in the Americas, ch. IV, ¶ 17 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.oas.
org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/hate/Hate_Speech_Incitement_Violence_Against_LGBTI.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 IACHR Report].
130
Botero 2009 Report, supra note 128, ¶ 524.
131
Id. ¶ 544 (emphasis added).
132
American Convention, supra note 116, art. 13(5).
133
See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (describing the harms encompassed under ICCPR
Article 20 as discrimination, hostility, and violence, but noting the Special Rapporteur’s restrictive
understanding “hostility”).
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the form of subsequent sanctions rather than prior restraints.134 The InterAmerican Special Rapporteur has also cautioned that legal prohibitions
may not be effective to counter hateful speech and that, instead, states
should deploy a more holistic approach that involves a variety of good
governance measures. This echoes calls at the U.N. level to seek use of
non-censorial methods first to combat intolerance.135 Specifically:
[n]egative or derogatory portrayal and other expressions that stigmatize
LGBTI persons are certainly offensive and hurtful and they increase the
marginalization, stigmatization, and general insecurity of LGBTI persons.
However, the IACHR is of the opinion that the legal prohibition of this type of
speech will not do away with the stigma, prejudice, and hatred against LGBTI
persons that is deeply rooted in the societies of the Americas. In many
contexts, given the structural social inequalities, discriminatory views and
prejudice in public discourse cannot be eradicated through legal sanctions . . . .
[M]ore should be done to promote a comprehensive approach that goes
beyond legal measures and includes preventive and educational mechanisms
and measures implemented by States, media, and society in general.136

As noted above, the Inter-American approach also imposes strict tests of
legality, necessity, and legitimacy, including by requiring governments to
prove that they selected the “least intrusive means.”137
B. The European Human Rights System
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), which was adopted in

134
2015 IACHR Report, supra note 129, ¶ 20 (“as with any other restriction on freedom of
expression, the imposition of subsequent sanctions must satisfy the requirements set forth in Article
13(2) of the American Convention and be applied by an independent state entity.”). It should be noted
that in 2020 the InterAmerican Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance
entered into force when two countries submitted their instruments of ratification. Signatories and
Ratifications, INTER-AM. CONVENTION AGAINST ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION & INTOLERANCE,
https://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_a-69_discrimination_intolerance_signatories.asp
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022); Organization of American States, Convention Against All Forms of
Discrimination and Intolerance, O.A.S.T.S. No.
,
U.N.T.S. . Although this treaty contains
facially broad bans on intolerant speech in Article 4, one would presume that the Inter-American system
would continue to apply its rigorous and principled approach to legality, legitimacy, and necessity as
well as its high thresholds for incitement when interpreting these provisions.
135
See supra notes 47-52, 106 and accompanying text (describing the U.N.’s endorsement of a
toolkit of governmental measures that should be deployed to tackle hate and intolerance before
resorting to speech bans).
136
2015 IACHR Report, supra note 129, ¶ 21.
137
See Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., supra note 120, ¶ 84-85 and accompanying text.
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1950, entered into force in 1953, and has 47 state parties,138 provides the
foundation for the most developed human rights adjudicatory system
worldwide. Though the European Convention’s protection of freedom of
expression echoed UDHR Article 19 and preceded ICCPR Article 19, the
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) has developed a
jurisprudential approach which varies in a number of respects from the
U.N.’s approach, with particular salience in the context of hate speech.139
Article 10 of the European Convention provides that freedom of expression
“shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers.”140 Article 10(2), similar to ICCPR Article 19(3),
permits restrictions when a three-part test is met: the restrictions must be
(1) prescribed by law and (2) necessary in a democratic society for (3)
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.141
Despite similar phrasing to the ICCPR, the European Court has
diminished the burden on governments to demonstrate the validity of hate
speech bans. It has, for example, taken the position that certain hate speech
falls outside the scope of Article 10’s protections if the speaker is using
freedom of expression to undermine other rights in the Convention.142
138
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter ECHR].
139
This Article focuses on an examination of the over forty cases that are highlighted in the
European Court of Human Rights, September 2020 Fact Sheet on Hate Speech. EUR. CT. H.R., FACT
SHEET – HATE SPEECH (Sep. 2020), https://perma.cc/37QL-KXM7 [hereinafter ECtHR Fact Sheet on
Hate Speech].
140
ECHR, supra note 138, art. 10. This article also provides that it “shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.” Id.
141 Id.
142
See Lilliendahl v. Iceland, App. No. 29297/18, ¶¶ 33-40 (May 12, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-203199. In this case, the European Court explained that its jurisprudence on hate speech
falls into two categories. Id. ¶ 33. The first category “is comprised of the gravest forms of ‘hate speech,’
which the Court has considered fall under Article 17 and thus [are] excluded entirely from the
protection of Article 10.” Id. ¶ 34. ECHR Article 17 provides that
[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right
to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.
ECHR, supra note 138, art. 17. When the European Court determines that speech falls in this category,
it finds the appeal inadmissible, thereby relieving the government of demonstrating the validity of the
hate speech ban under Article 10, which effectively leaves the national penalty intact. See, e.g.,
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When confronted with such speech, the European Court finds the case
inadmissible without reaching the merits, leaving in place the challenged
national penalty for such expression.143 Examples of hate speech that reach
this level include: the possession and intention to distribute materials that
called on immigrants to depart the Netherlands;144 display of a poster from a
home window that showed the Twin Towers in flames and stated “Islam
out of Britain–Protect British People;”145 upload of YouTube videos that
called for Muslims to fight non-Muslims;146 and publication of anti-Semitic
statements by a newspaper owner and editor.147 In addition, the European
Court has determined that a variety of forms of Holocaust denial do not fall
within the protection of the European Convention.148
When it identifies “less grave” forms of hate speech, the European
Court examines whether the government’s intrusion on speech is consistent
with the European Convention’s protection for freedom of expression.149
However, the European Court frequently relies on a doctrine known as the
“margin of appreciation,”150 under which it defers to governmental
judgments, including when states disagree about the scope of a right.151 The
European Court affords governments a particularly wide margin of
appreciation when expression offends religious or moral convictions, when
competing rights need to be balanced, or when there is the potential for

Norwood v. the United Kingdom, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 342, 343 (2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?
i=001-67632 (finding applicant’s appeal inadmissible because the speech in question contravened
Article 17). The second category of hate speech “is comprised of ‘less grave’ forms of ‘hate speech’
which the Court has not considered to fall entirely outside the protection of Article 10, but which it has
considered permissible for Contracting States to restrict.” Lilliendahl, App. No 29292/18, ¶ 35 (May 12,
2020). For hate speech that falls into the second category, the Court will assess if Article 10(2)’s threepart test is met. Id. ¶¶ 39-48 (analyzing whether the legality, legitimacy, and necessity tests were met
for hate speech that fell within the second category).
143
For examples of particular cases that meet this threshold, see infra notes 144-48 and
accompanying text.
144
Glimmerveen v. The Netherlands, App. Nos. 8348/78 & 8406/78, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 187, 188-97 (1979).
145
Norwood, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 343.
146
Belkacem v. Belgium, App. No. 34367/14, ¶¶ 5-7 (June 27, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-175941.
147
Ivanov v. Russia, App. No. 35222/04, 1 (Feb. 20, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-79
619.
148
Id.; M’Bala v. France, App. No. 25239/13, ¶ 39 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i
=001-158752; Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 1, 23.
149
Lilliendahl, App. No. 29297/18, ¶ 35-36.
150
PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 946-48 (2012)
(explaining the “margin of appreciation”).
151
See id. at 947.
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violence.152 However, the European Court will narrow the margin of
appreciation in situations where the speaker is discussing certain matters of
public concern.153 In 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
unequivocally rejected any application of the margin of appreciation with
regard to freedom of expression.154
The European Court has also invoked the margin of appreciation in
deferring to governmental assessments about the appropriateness of hate
speech convictions. For example, in the Soulas case, which involved
France imposing criminal penalties on those responsible for the publication
of an anti-immigrant book,155 the European Court noted that speech
restrictions must be convincingly established, but observed that dealing
with issues of immigration and integration “is up to the national authorities,
who have a deep understanding of the realities of the country. They must
therefore have a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to determine . . .
the need for such interference [with expression].”156 As another example, in
sustaining Russia’s conviction of a journalist for inciting hatred, the Court
relied on its margin of appreciation doctrine to accept that the speaker’s
article could stir up “base emotions or embedded prejudices” against those

152
See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 235, ¶ 25 (2005); Tagiyev v. Azerbaijan, App.
No. 13274/08, ¶ 39 (Dec. 5, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-198705; Delfi AS v. Estonia,
App. No. 64569/09, ¶ 139 (June 16, 2015), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-155105; Magyar
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesulete v. Hungary, App. No. 22947/13, ¶ 59 (Feb. 2, 2016), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-160314; Terentyev v. Russia, App. No. 10692/09, ¶ 65 (Aug. 28, 2018), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-185307.
153
See, e.g., Mondragon v. Spain, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 835, ¶ 51 (finding that an elected official’s
speech on matters involving his government’s welcome of a head of state and related allegations of illtreatment constituted an issue of public interest that narrows the margin of appreciation); Tagiyev, App.
No. 13274/08, ¶¶ 37-39 (Dec. 5, 2019) (noting that a reduced margin of appreciation applies for
expression concerning public interest matters, but a wide margin of appreciation is afforded for “matters
liable to offend personal convictions within the sphere of morals or religion”).
154
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, supra note 30, ¶ 36 (observing that
the scope of freedom of expression is not to be assessed using the margin of appreciation doctrine).
155
Soulas v. France, App. No. 15948/03, ¶¶ 15, 43-44, 47-48 (July 10, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-87370. In this case, the ECtHR upheld a French conviction for incitement to hatred
and violence against a particular group of people. Id. ¶ 48.The complainants were those involved with
the publication of a book titled “Colonization of Europe.” Id. ¶ 6. Under the title appeared the
following: “True Discourse on Immigration and Islam.” Id. The French court had found the book
contained punishable speech because, among other things, it described Muslim immigrants in France
as rebels against the application of the laws in force in France and generally indulging in the
practice of criminal activities, not only for the purpose of profit arising from their fundamental
inability to integrate into normal economic life but also, being animated by a feeling of antiEuropean racism, with a view to conquering the territory to exclude the population of European
origin and ensure both their power and the hegemonic implantation of the Muslim religion.
Id.
156
Id. ¶¶ 35, 38.
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of non-Russian ethnicity, which justified governmental intervention.157 And
again, in upholding Turkey’s criminal fines on a managing director of a
publishing house for blasphemy, the Court emphasized the particular
importance of the margin of appreciation’s role.158
In addition to this deference, the European Court differs significantly
from the U.N. and Inter-American systems when applying the legality,
legitimacy, and necessity conditions. The European Court has explained
that the legality (or “prescribed by law”) test means that the interference
with speech has a basis in domestic law, is accessible to the person
concerned who must be able to foresee its consequences, and is compatible
with the rule of law.159 In a 2016 report, one of the authors highlighted
vagueness problems with the European human rights system in particular. 160
A review of leading hate speech cases reveals three trends that are
relevant to this concern about the European Court’s approach to vagueness.
First, the Court frequently has found that hate speech restrictions which
would likely fail for vagueness and/or overbreadth under international
standards nevertheless meet the European Convention’s legality test.161 For
instance, the Court held that a law in Bosnia and Herzegovina which
criminalized inciting or stirring up “national, racial, or religious hatred,
discord, or intolerance” satisfied the legality test.162 Similarly, the Court
held Sweden’s penal code, which punishes expressions of contempt against
particular groups, met the legality condition.163 The Court also determined
that Iceland’s criminalization of “anyone who publicly mocks, defames,
denigrates or threatens a person or group of persons” with certain
characteristics passed the legality test.164 Such restrictions would likely fail
international standards due to vagueness or overbreadth, absent clear
interpretative guidance on their scope.
Second, the European Court has dismissed vagueness arguments as
improperly raised under the legality test, instead considering them as part
of the necessity condition. For example, when a member of parliament
157

Atamanchuk v. Russia, App. No. 4493/11, ¶ 64 (Feb. 11, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i
=001-200839.
158
I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25.
159
Dink v. Turkey, App. No. 2668/07, ¶ 114 (Sept. 14, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001100383.
160
Special Rapporteur 2016 Report to UNGA, supra note 31, ¶ 25.
161
For a discussion of the U.N. human rights machinery’s application of the vagueness test, see
supra notes 38-39, 94-98 and accompanying text.
162
Smajić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 48657/16, ¶ 13 (Jan. 16, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-180956.
163
Vejdeland v. Sweden, App. No. 1813/07, ¶ 49 (Feb. 9, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0
01-109046.
164
Lilliendahl, App. No. 29297/18, ¶¶ 20, 42 (May 12, 2020).
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argued that his criminal conviction for “serious insult” against Spain’s king
was based on a vague law, the Court held that the law passed the legality
test and stated it would address the vagueness concerns in its analysis of
whether the interference with speech was proportionate to the state’s aim. 165
In another case, a person convicted under Russia’s penal code for inciting
hatred “or enmity and humiliating the dignity of an individual or a group of
individuals on the grounds of their membership of a social group” argued
that he could not have foreseen the law being applied to the police as a
“social group.”166 The Court again declined to consider this vagueness
argument under the legality condition and instead explained it would assess
this issue when considering whether the punishment was proportionate to
the state’s aim.167 Under international standards, collapsing vagueness with
proportionality is inappropriate, as governments bear the burden of proving
that each prong of the legality, legitimacy, and proportionality test is met.168
When it collapses the tests, the European Court gives short shrift to
legality/vagueness as an independent protection against unlawful speech
restrictions and weakens its version of the three-part test.
Third, speakers frequently do not even contest the legality condition,
including vagueness, in the hate speech cases that they appeal to the
European Court. For example, in another case involving a conviction for
serious insult to Spain’s king, the speakers conceded that the legality test
was met.169 Similarly, a journalist convicted under a Danish law that
criminalizes “threatening, insulting or degrading a group of persons on
account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin or belief” conceded
that the legality condition was satisfied.170 In many other cases, the speakers
also did not contest speech restrictions based on vagueness, likely because
of the Court’s tolerance for vague wording in hate speech bans.171
With respect to the legitimacy test, the European Court has found that
certain public interest objectives are sufficiently important to survive this
test despite the fact that they would not survive scrutiny in the U.N. system.
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Mondragon, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215, ¶¶ 35, 45-46.
Terentyev, App. No. 10692/09, ¶¶ 30, 42 (Aug. 28, 2018).
167
Id. ¶ 58.
168
See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
169
Taulats, App. No. 51168/15, ¶ 25 (Mar. 13, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181719.
170
Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, ¶¶ 19, 27 (Sept. 23, 1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-57891.
171
See, e.g., Lehideux v. France, App. No. 55/1997/839/1045 ¶ 39 (Sept. 23, 1998), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58245; Altintas v. Turkey, App. No. 50495/08, ¶ 27 (Mar. 10, 2020),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-201897; I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 22; Soulas, App.
No. 15948/03, ¶ 26 (July 10, 2008); Erbakan v. Turkey, App. No. 59405/00, ¶ 45 (July 6, 2006), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76232.
166
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For example, the European Court has determined that the goal of not
offending religious sensibilities is a sufficient governmental interest to
justify restricting speech.172 Though not in the context of a hate speech case,
the European Court has also found that the governmental goal of having
people live together in society is an appropriate public interest objective to
pursue when limiting rights.173
As to the necessity test, commentators have observed that the
European Court does not apply a “least intrusive means” test, but rather
focuses solely on whether the interference with speech is proportionate.174
A review of the cases listed in the European Court’s 2020 Hate Speech Fact
Sheet is consistent with this observation.175 Overall, the Court did not
require the government to demonstrate that the interference with expression
was the least intrusive means of achieving its legitimate public interest
objective.176
Instead, the European Court focused on whether the interference with
speech was proportionate in these cases. It engaged in its proportionality
assessment through a three prong inquiry: whether (1) there is a pressing
social need for the interference with speech, (2) the interference is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and (3) the reasons provided
by the government are relevant and sufficient.177 In this inquiry, the Court
often notes that it is balancing freedom of expression with other rights or

172

See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (determining that
the goal of protecting citizens from having their religious feelings insulted constituted a legitimate
public aim). In Otto Preminger, Austria seized a film that risked offending the religious sensibilities of
Christians in an area that was over 85% Roman Catholic. Id. ¶ 52. The Court found that “in the context
of religious opinions and beliefs’’ there is an obligation on speakers “to avoid as far as possible
expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights.” Id. ¶ 49.
The Court viewed the film’s offensive expression as requiring it to balance freedom of expression
interests with “the right of other persons to proper respect for their freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.” Id. ¶ 55. The U.N. system, on the other hand, has consistently opined that neither freedom of
religion nor freedom of expression “protect ideas or beliefs from ridicule, abuse, criticism or other
‘attacks.’” See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Similarly, it should be noted that the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights overturned Chile’s prior censorship of a film that risked offending
religious sensibilities. See The Last Temptation of Christ v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73 (2001) (Feb. 5, 2001).
173
See Dakir v. Belgium, App. No. 4619/12, ¶ 57 (July 11, 2017), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-175660 (finding that the public interest objective of having people live together in society is a
legitimate governmental reason to ban burqas).
174
See, e.g., JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND
PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 114 (2009) (noting the ECtHR’s
“general rejection of the less and least onerous means-test” in its jurisprudence).
175
See ECtHR Fact Sheet on Hate Speech, supra note 139.
176
See id.
177
Stomakhin v. Russia, App. No. 52273/07, ¶¶ 90-91 (May 9, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-182731.
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interests of the state.178 For example, in 2018, the European Court found
Russia’s conviction of a journalist who appealed to “extremist activities
through the mass media” and “incit[ed] hatred and enmity [and]
humiliat[ed] the dignity of an individual or group” did not comport with
Article 10 of the European Convention.179 The Court found that certain of
the journalist’s statements that called the Russian security forces
“maniacs,” “murderers,” and other criminally-minded terminology, would
“stir up a deep-seated and irrational hatred towards them in a clear attempt
to justify and advocate violent actions against them,” and “expose them to
the possible risk of physical violence.”180 The European Court found that
there was a pressing need and relevant and sufficient reasons to interfere
with such speech.181 However, the Court found that the punishment
(imprisonment for five years and a three-year prohibition on engaging in
journalism) was disproportionate.182 In another application of its
proportionality inquiry, the Court determined that Denmark’s conviction of
a journalist for reporting on derogatory and racist comments was not
proportionate to the aim of protecting the rights and reputations of others
because the purpose of the speaker’s work was to expose and analyze racist
groups, not to promote their racist message.183
Within its proportionality analysis, the Court has often found that
interferences with expression “capable” of harm are proportionate to the
state’s legitimate aim. Further, it has done so without requiring the
government to demonstrate with specificity the speaker’s intent to cause
harm and the likelihood of near-term harm (i.e., imminence). For example,
the European Court upheld Russia’s conviction of a journalist for inciting
hatred because his article “could be reasonably assessed” as stirring up
prejudices towards non-Russians.184 Similarly, the European Court
concluded that France’s conviction of a cartoonist for publishing satirical
drawings after 9/11 was proportionate because those drawings could stoke
violence and have a “plausible impact on public order.”185 The Court has
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180
181
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Id. ¶ 96; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49.
Stomakhin v. Russia, App. No. 52273/07, ¶¶ 45, 133-34 (May 9, 2018).
Id. ¶ 107.
Id. ¶ 109.
Id. ¶¶ 128-30.
Jersild, App. No. 15890/89, ¶¶ 33-37 (Sept. 23, 1994).
Atamanchuk, App. No. 4493/11, ¶ 64 (Feb. 11, 2020).
Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, ¶ 45 (Oct. 2, 2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-

88657.
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not required a finding of intent to incite near-term harm or likely near-term
harm when upholding a variety of other hate speech convictions. 186
In its hate speech cases, the European Court has even explicitly stated
that the intent of the speaker and the likelihood of imminent harm (which
are key factors in the U.N.’s necessity approach) are not needed to uphold
hate speech convictions.187 When hate speech is not linked to potential
violence or crime, the Court’s decisions are “based on an assessment of the
content of the expression and the manner of its delivery.”188 For example,
the European Court has noted that “wanton denigration” and insulting
speech is enough to place speech outside the protection of the European
Convention.189 In a 2020 case, the European Court noted that “attacks on
persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering
specific groups of the population can be sufficient for allowing the
authorities to favour combating prejudicial speech within the context of
permitted restrictions on freedom of expression.”190
C. The African Human Rights System
The central document in the African human rights system is the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which entered into force in
1986 and has 54 state parties.191 Article 9 of the African Charter provides
that every person has the right to (1) “receive information,” and (2) “to
express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”192 Though the
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) has decided
very few freedom of expression cases to date, some important hate speech
observations can be drawn from its existing jurisprudence, as well as a
recently adopted declaration.
In a case in which it overturned criminal sanctions for defamation, the
African Court acknowledged that, unlike other international and regional
186

See, e.g., Nix v. Germany, App. No. 35285/16, (Mar. 13, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i
=001-182241; Soulas and Others, App. No. 15948/03 (July 10, 2008); Šimunić v. Croatia, App. No.
20373/17 (Jan. 22, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189769; I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 249; Gündüz, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 257; Vejdeland, App. No. 1813/07 (Feb. 9, 2012); Sürek
v. Turkey (No. 3), 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 353.
187
See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text (describing ECtHR views about hate speech
that is not protected despite a lack of imminent harm or a speaker’s intention to create harm).
188
Lilliendahl, App. No. 29297/18, ¶ 36 (May 12, 2020).
189
Savva Terentyev, App. No. 10692/09, ¶ 68 (Aug. 28, 2018); Gündüz, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
41.
190
Lilliendahl, App. No. 29297/18, ¶ 36 (May 12, 2020).
191
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M.
58, https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49; Ratification Table – African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49 (last viewed Feb. 2, 2022).
192
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 191, art. 9.
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treaties, the African Charter does not explicitly provide for application of
the legality, legitimacy, and necessity principles when governments limit
speech.193 However, the African Court has read into the text the need for
application of the legality, legitimacy, and necessity tests in any restriction
on freedom of expression in a way that displays the goal of convergence
with U.N. standards.194 For example, in the Konaté decision, the Court
interpreted “within the law” in Article 9 to mean the law restricting speech
must not be improperly vague.195 Regarding the legitimacy test, the Court
viewed the interests set forth in Article 27(2) of the African Charter (i.e.,
“the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”),
as well as the public interest objectives in ICCPR Article 19(3), as
constituting the legitimate reasons for which government can restrict
speech.196 With respect to the “necessity” condition, the African Court
focused primarily on the need for restrictions to be proportionate.197 Noting
that the European Court viewed hate speech as warranting criminal
sanctions, the African Court observed that it would view “incitement to
international crimes” and “public incitement to hatred, discrimination or
violence or threats” as warranting imprisonment.198 The African Court did
not include an analysis of the “least intrusive means test” in its decision,
but instead turned to the European Court’s approach toward hate speech,
which risks taking African jurisprudence down a path that departs from
U.N. standards.
In a subsequent decision, Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda, an
appeal of a criminal conviction for minimization of genocide, the African
Court reinforced the approach to the legality, legitimacy, and necessity
tests that it articulated in its Konaté decision.199 In addition, the Court
explicitly endorsed granting governments a “margin of appreciation” in
assessing freedom of expression claims,200 despite the U.N. Human Rights

193
Konaté v. Burkina Faso, No. 004/2013, Decision, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
[Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 129 (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/
Judgment%20Appl.004-2013%20Lohe%20Issa%20Konate%20v%20Burkina%20Faso%20-English.pdf.
194
Konaté, [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶¶ 129-31, 134-35, and 139-66.
195
Id. ¶¶ 129-131.
196
Id. ¶¶ 134-135.
197
Id. ¶¶ 139-166.
198
Id. ¶¶ 158, 165.
199
Umuhoza v. Rwanda, No. 003/2014, Decision, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
[Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶¶ 120-63 (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/
public/5fa/a76/468/5faa7646871e5498448857.pdf.
200
Id. ¶ 138 (stating that in “considering the margin of appreciation that the Respondent State
enjoys in defining and prohibiting some criminal acts in its domestic legislation, the Court is of the
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Committee’s rejection of this doctrine.201 Though the Court ultimately
found that the criminal sanction for genocide minimization in this
particular case violated the African Charter’s freedom of expression
guarantee,202 it did note that “[s]tatements that deny or minimize the
magnitude or effects of the genocide or that unequivocally insinuate the
same fall outside the domain of the legitimate exercise of the right to
freedom of expression and should be prohibited by law.” 203 Such an
approach contrasts with the U.N.’s Human Rights and the ICERD
Committees’ approach to genocide denial,204 which were not cited in the
opinion.
Following these opinions, in 2019, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa (African
Declaration),205 which brings the African approach closer to U.N. standards
on hate speech. For example, Principle 9(1) of the Declaration closely
mirrors the U.N. interpretations of ICCPR Article 19’s legality,206
legitimacy,207 and necessity tests.208 Notably, the African Declaration
view that the impugned laws provide adequate notice for individuals”). Thus the Court relied on the
margin of appreciation doctrine in assessing the legality (i.e., vagueness) challenge to the law. Id.
201
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
202
Umuhoza, [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 163.
203
Id. ¶ 158.
204
See supra notes 99-102 (observing that both Committees take the position that atrocity denial
should not be prohibited absent incitement to likely and imminent harm). The European Court has,
however condoned bans on genocide denials. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
205
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression and Access to Information in Africa (Nov. 2019), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/
detail?id=69 [hereinafter African Declaration].
206
The African Declaration defines the legality test as meaning that any speech restrictions must be
“clear, precise, accessible and foreseeable . . . overseen by an independent body in a manner that is not
arbitrary or discriminatory . . . and effectively safeguards against abuse including through the provision
of a right of appeal to independent and impartial courts.” Id. principle 9(2). The U.N.’s human rights
monitors interpret legality similarly. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (describing the
vagueness test and the need for independent court adjudication).
207
The African Declaration defines legitimate public interest aims as encompassing all the aims in
ICCPR Article 19(3) with the exception of “morals.” Compare African Declaration, supra note 205,
Principle 9(3), with the public interest objectives set forth in ICCPR Article 19(3), supra note 10 and
accompanying text. In addition, unlike the African Court’s prior decisions, the African Declaration did
not endorse as “legitimate” objectives for speech restrictions the interests set forth in African Charter
Article 27(2). Compare African Declaration, supra note 205, Principle 9(3), with the African Court’s
decisions in Konaté, [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶¶ 129-31, and Umuhoza, [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 140. However, an
African Commission on Human Rights decision that was adopted the same month as the Declaration
seems to have accepted African Charter Article 27’s additional list of governmental interests. See
Uwimana-Nkusi v. Rwanda, Communication 426/12, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 161 (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/
English/Decision%20on%20Comm%20426-12_ENG.pdf (noting Article 27 permits restrictions on
rights in the African Charter, including freedom of expression).
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limited the scope of permissible governmental objectives209 and endorsed
not only a proportionality analysis but also a “least restrictive means”
analysis as part of the necessity test.210 In addition, the African Declaration
adopted a mandatory ban on hate speech that is phrased similarly to ICCPR
Article 20211 and endorsed U.N. interpretations about only criminalizing
such speech as a last resort after assessing contextual factors endorsed by
U.N. experts (including the intent of the speaker as well as the likelihood
and imminence of violence, discrimination, or hostility).212 The Declaration
was silent as to whether the African human rights machinery should defer
to governments by invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine when
208

The African Declaration defines the necessity condition as requiring that a speech limitation:
originate from a pressing and substantial need that is relevant and sufficient; have a direct
and immediate connection to the expression and disclosure of information, and be the least
restrictive means of achieving the stated aim; and be such that the benefit of protecting the
stated interest outweighs the harm to the expression and disclosure of information, including
with respect to the sanctions authorised.
African Declaration, supra note 205, principle 19(4) (emphasis added).
209
Id. principle 9(3) (stating that only ICCPR Article 19(3) objectives, other than “morals,” qualify
as legitimate objectives and dropping African Charter Article 27’s list of governmental interests).
210
Compare supra note 208 (describing the Declaration’s approach to the “necessity” test, which
explicitly includes a “least restrictive means” test and proportionality assessment) with supra notes 4655 and accompanying text (describing how the U.N. system’s necessity test includes both a “least
intrusive means” and a proportionality analysis as well as noting the requirement for a “direct and
immediate connection” between the restriction and the expression).
211
African Declaration, supra note 205, principle 23(1) (“States shall prohibit any speech that
advocates for national, racial, religious or other forms of discriminatory hatred which constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”).
212
Id., principle 23(2). When determining if hate speech rises to the level of severity for the
imposition of criminal sanctions, states should consider
(a.) prevailing social and political context; (b.) status of the speaker in relation to the audience; (c.)
existence of a clear intent to incite; (d.) content and form of the speech; (e.) extent of the speech,
including its public nature, size of audience and means of dissemination; (f.) real likelihood and
imminence of harm.
Id. (emphasis added). These factors are very similar to those in the U.N.’s Rabat Plan of Action as well
as those endorsed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur in 2012. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying
text. In 2019, the African Commission on Human Rights issued a noteworthy decision that overturned
Rwandan criminal convictions of journalists who had published articles critical of government policy
(particularly of the president) and of the Gacaca court system set up following the 1994 genocide in the
country. Uwimana-Nkusi, [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], (Nov. 10, 2019). Rwanda defended its criminal
sanctions, inter alia, on the grounds that “chaos and [a] circle of violence” could result from such
expression. Id. ¶¶ 75-80. While the Commission acknowledged that the history of the Rwandan
genocide could counsel in favor of certain restrictions on expression, it found that the specific context
involved–after reviewing the necessity standards (including a lack of intent and immediacy of
consequences)–meant that the Rwandan convictions were inconsistent with Article 9 of the African
Charter. Id. ¶¶ 175-209. However, the Commission also noted that “following the conclusion of the
European Court that denial of Holocaust is not protected under freedom of expression, the Commission
holds that in Rwanda as well expressions that entail denial of the genocide against the Tutsi cannot be
protected under Art. 9 of the African Charter.” Id. ¶ 207. Such an approach departs from the U.N.
Human Rights Committee’s view that atrocity denial is protected speech. See supra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text.
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adjudicating allegations of freedom of expression violations. While it will
be important to monitor how the African Declaration is interpreted and
implemented in freedom of expression cases by the African Court and
Commission,213 the Declaration itself provides a strong foundation for
convergence with the U.N.’s approach to the legality, legitimacy, and
necessity tests.
D. Emergent Regional Approaches
While the Americas, Europe, and Africa enjoy the most developed
human rights systems, other regional and religious-based organizations
have adopted approaches that seem to assert independence from U.N. legal
standards in their normative frameworks. This Section begins by discussing
the approach of the League of Arab States and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), before turning to the OIC’s religion-based
approach. These newer and weakly-institutionalized initiatives do not have
functioning and legally binding enforcement mechanisms like the InterAmerican, European and African systems. In addition, the OIC and
ASEAN approaches are centered on non-binding declarations rather than
treaties.214 This Section discusses these newer initiatives to highlight how
their emerging normative approaches diverge significantly from global
standards, signaling potential further challenges to the U.N. system.
The Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in
2004.215 Article 32 of the Arab Charter sets forth the right to freedom of
information and expression: “The present Charter guarantees the right to
information and to freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the right

213
In a case decided after the African Declaration was adopted, the complainant argued that
enforcement of Benin’s law that “punish[ed] the offences of racially motivated and xenophobic insults
using a computer system and that of incitement to hatred and violence on such grounds as race, colour,
national or ethnic origin, or religion” violated freedom of expression. Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, No.
062/2019, Decision, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 121 (Dec. 4,
2020), https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/602/10a/50c/60210a50cb6e2538
353022.pdf. In finding no freedom of expression violation, the Court did not set forth its analysis in
detail. In applying the legality test, the Court did not commemorate an analysis of why the legal
prohibition met the vagueness test nor discuss any national court interpretations that may have remedied
any ambiguities; rather, it noted the test was met. Id. ¶ 122. In its necessity and proportionality analysis,
the Court did not assess the speakers’ intent or the likelihood of imminent harm in holding this test was
met; rather, it asserted that possible harm was sufficient to meet this test. Id. ¶ 127.
214
See infra notes 219 and 224 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant ASEAN and
OIC declarations.
215
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int’l
Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005) [hereinafter Arab Charter]. The Arab League has adopted a statute for an
Arab Human Rights Court, but the Court is not yet functioning. League of Arab States, INTERNAT’L
CTR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (Sept. 25, 2021), https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Transnational_
arabcharter2004en.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
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to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium,
regardless of geographical boundaries.”216 The Charter also states that:
“Such rights and freedoms shall be exercised in conformity with the
fundamental values of society and . . . subject only to such limitations as are
required to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others or the
protection of national security, public order and public health or morals.”217
The Charter differs from U.N. standards on freedom of expression in
various ways. First, it does not mention that restrictions on speech must be
“provided by law” to achieve legitimate governmental objectives (i.e., it
omits the legality condition). Second, it states that individuals are expected
to exercise their speech rights in accordance with the fundamental values of
society (an amorphous concept that limits the speaker rather than the
government), thereby presuming a “legitimate” public interest objective for
speech limitations. And third, it is unclear how the word “required” will be
interpreted. Will it include the concepts of least intrusive means and
proportionality, as defined by the U.N.’s “necessary” test? These are three
significant ways in which the Arab Charter risks departing from the U.N.’s
rigorous tests of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. The failure of the Arab
League to clarify its consistency with international human rights norms
does not bode well in constraining problematic government limitations on
speech.
While not a treaty with legally binding obligations, the 2012 ASEAN
Declaration of Human Rights218 also fell short of global human rights
standards.219 With respect to freedom of expression, the ASEAN
Declaration provides a general statement of the right: “Every person has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression, including freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information,
whether orally, in writing or through any other medium of that person’s
choice.”220 This is similar to the U.N. definition; however, the ASEAN
Declaration contains a variety of limitations clauses, which temper all of
the listed rights, thus appearing to depart from global standards. For
example, Article 7 of the Declaration appears to espouse cultural relativism

216

Id. art. 32.
Id. (emphasis added).
218
Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, ¶ 23, Nov. 19, 2012,
https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration].
219
See U.N. Official Welcomes ASEAN Commitment to Human Rights, But Concerned Over
Wording, U.N. NEWS (Nov. 19, 2012), https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/11/426012#.UPgVKGckSOI
(noting that, given inconsistencies with the U.N.’s minimum human rights protection, it is important
that problematic language in the Declaration not “become a part of any binding regional human rights
convention.”).
220
ASEAN Declaration, supra note 218, ¶ 23.
217
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in assessing the scope of rights rather than cementing global minimum
standards in respect for human rights.221 It will be important to monitor
future ASEAN interpretations to determine if this Declaration is applied in
a manner consistent with U.N. standards.222
Although the OIC’s Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,223
an instrument that does not contain legally binding obligations, emerged
from a religion-based (rather than geography-based) institution, it bears
mentioning as the OIC is the second largest intergovernmental organization
after the UN224 and is active in human rights norm-setting discussions in
U.N. fora.225 The Cairo Declaration, which was revised and (re-)adopted in
2020,226 departs from U.N. standards on freedom of expression in a variety
of ways.227 For example, it does not define the scope of the right and
focuses instead on restrictions, which leaves the definition and scope of the

221
Id. art. 7 (providing that “the realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and
national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and
religious backgrounds”).
222
In 2019, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights hosted a consultation on
freedom of expression and received “inputs on the formulation of the Recommendation on the
Implementation of the Article 23 of the AHRD to serve as a common language for human rights
cooperation and actions in the context of regionalism in ASEAN.” See 2019 AICHR Consultation on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression in ASEAN (Article 23 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration),
AICHR, https://aichr.org/news/the-2019-aichr-consultation-on-freedom-of-opinion-and-expression-inasean-article-23-of-the-asean-human-rights-declaration. The eventual Recommendation on freedom of
expression could serve as an opportunity to unequivocally align the ASEAN approach with the U.N.’s
minimum universal standards.
223
Cairo Declaration, supra note 18.
224
See OIC History, supra note 17.
225
See, e.g., Suzanne Nossel, Advancing Human Rights in the U.N. System, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS 15-16 (2012), https://perma.cc/P2TC-L3NC (describing the role of the OIC in U.N.
developments on blasphemy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression).
226
See supra notes 18 and 21.
227
The Cairo Declaration’s provision on freedom of expression provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. The exercise of this right carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. The State has the obligation to protect and facilitate the exercise
of this right while also protecting its legitimate national integrity and interests, as well as promoting
harmony, welfare, justice and equity within society. Any restrictions on the exercise of this right, to
be clearly defined in the law, and shall be limited to the following categories: i. Propaganda for war.
ii. Advocacy of hatred, discrimination or violence on grounds of religion, belief, national origin,
race, ethnicity, color, language, sex or socio-economic status. iii. Respect for the human rights or
reputation of others. iv. Matters relating to national security and public order. v. Measures required
for the protection of public health or morals.
The State and society shall endeavor to disseminate and promote the principles of tolerance, justice
and peaceful coexistence among other noble principles and values, and to discourage hatred,
prejudice, violence and terrorism. Freedom of expression should not be used for denigration of
religions and prophets or to violate the sanctities of religious symbols or to undermine the moral
and ethical values of society.
Cairo Declaration, supra note 18, art. 22(b)-(c) (emphasis added).
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right unclear.228 Moreover, it departs from ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite
test for speech restrictions. It does not explicitly include a requirement that
limitations on speech be “necessary,” which risks omitting an analysis of
whether speech restrictions constitute the least intrusive means and are
proportional.229 In addition, the Cairo Declaration and related
interpretations refer to grounds for restricting speech that go beyond those
enumerated in the ICCPR,230 including by treating blasphemy as
permissible grounds for restricting speech.231 In adopting this approach, the
OIC’s Human Rights Commission praised the European Court of Human
Rights’ reluctance to prohibit the criminalization of blasphemy, speech that
offends religious sensibilities, or displays religious intolerance.232 In
addition, Article 25 of the Cairo Declaration appears to limit all rights,
including freedom of expression, based on religious interpretations and
national legislation, which is inconsistent with international standards. 233 It
will be important to monitor OIC interpretations to see if such deficiencies
in the Declaration’s text are remedied, though a 2015 OIC Human Rights

228
Compare id. (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”), with ICCPR, supra
note 10, art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”).
229
See supra note 227 (setting forth the text of the Cairo Declaration’s free expression provision,
which does not contain a provision that speech limitations must be “necessary”).
230
For example, the Cairo Declaration seems to declare as legitimate public interest objectives
“national integrity and interests, as well as promoting harmony, welfare, justice and equity within
society.” See supra note 227. But the ICCPR does not contain such broad concepts. See ICCPR, supra
note 10, at 19(3).
231
The Cairo Declaration provides that “Freedom of expression should not be used for denigration
of religions and prophets or to violate the sanctities of religious symbols or to undermine the moral and
ethical values of society.” Supra note 227. In addition, the revised Cairo Declaration contains
“advocacy of hatred” as a legitimate basis for restricting speech. Id. A 2015 interpretation of the OIC
Human Rights Commission took the position that “sheer disrespect, defamation, insult, and negative
stereotyping constitute incitement to religious hatred,” which should not be protected speech. IPHRC
8th Session: Outcome Document of the Thematic Debate on ‘Freedom of Expression’ and ‘Hate
Speech’, OIC-IPHRC 1, 1, https://oic-iphrc.org/en/data/docs/session_reports/8th/8th_iphrc_thematic_
debate_outcome_en.pdf [hereinafter OIC 2015 Interpretation]. The U.N.’s human rights machinery,
however, has observed that such goals do not constitute legitimate public interest objectives for
restricting speech. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
232
OIC-IPHRC, supra note 21 (“the Commission recalled and reaffirmed . . . the jurisprudence
emerging from the European Court of Human Rights, which validates restrictions on freedom of
expression criticizing religious beliefs where such expression constitutes incitement to hatred and is
deemed offensive to the adherents of a particular religion.”).
233
Cairo Declaration, supra note 18, art. 25 (“Everyone has the right to exercise and enjoy the
rights and freedoms set out in the present declaration, without prejudice to the principles of Islam and
national legislation”).
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Commission interpretation of freedom of expression emphasized fewer
protections for speech than the U.N. system.234
III. REFLECTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Part III(A) provides an overview of areas of convergence and conflict
between U.N. and regional standards in the Inter-American, European, and
African systems with respect to hate speech and freedom of expression.
Part III(B) provides recommendations that human rights defenders can
deploy to reinforce the U.N.’s minimum standards in litigation before
national, regional, and international courts, as well as in advocacy efforts
regarding domestic laws and the regulation of speech by private platforms.
A. Comparison of Global and Regional Standards
Both the U.N. and regional human rights systems allow for hate
speech to be banned, but differences arise with the applicable criteria for
judging whether hate speech bans are valid. These conflicts generally arise
with respect to (1) governmental burdens to demonstrate the lawfulness of
speech bans, and (2) the substantive content of the legality, legitimacy, and
necessity conditions, which are foundational to assessing the lawfulness of
speech bans.
Under the U.N. and Inter-American human rights systems, the
government bears the burden of proving all restrictions on speech,
including hate speech, are valid.235 This creates a presumption in favor of
speech, with the government bearing the burden of proving the lawfulness
of restrictions. In contrast, the European Court has espoused some
jurisprudential doctrines that remove this burden.236 For example, the
European Court considers certain hate speech to be so offensive that it
deems freedom of expression-based appeals to be inadmissible, which
relieves the government from justifying the lawfulness of its speech
234
In 2015, before the adoption of the most recent version of the Cairo Declaration, the OIC’s
Human Rights Commission adopted a variety of views and recommendations about hate speech and
freedom of expression, many of which did not align with the U.N.’s minimum standards. OIC 2015
Interpretation, supra note 231. For example, the Outcome Document indicated that “sheer disrespect,
defamation, insult, and negative stereotyping constitute incitement to ‘religious hatred,’” which should
not be protected speech. Id. at 1. It emphasized that the “need to protect the sanctity of religions and
their symbols” (i.e., blasphemous speech) was to avoid the “defamatory stereotyping and insults” of
believers who are then subject to discrimination, hostility, and violence. Id. at 2. It criticized the U.N.
special procedures’ approach to hate speech as unbalanced. Id at 2. It cited favorably to the ICERD
Committee’s 1993 General Recommendation XV on Article 4 (regarding racist hate speech) rather than
its 2013 views General Recommendation 35, which provides a more speech protective approach to
combating racism (see supra notes 78-92).
235
See supra notes 30, 120 and accompanying text.
236
See supra notes 142-58.
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restriction and leaves the national punishment for the expression in place.237
In addition, the European Court consistently uses its margin of appreciation
doctrine to defer to judgments of governments, further lessening the state’s
burden to demonstrate compliance with free expression standards.238 The
African Court has also invoked the European-created margin of
appreciation doctrine in its jurisprudence.239 In a sharp, if implicit, rebuke to
the European Court over a decade ago, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
rejected the margin of appreciation doctrine for freedom of expression. 240
With respect to the legality component of the three-part test for
judging the lawfulness of speech bans, both the U.N. and Inter-American
systems rigorously assess whether hate speech laws are improperly
vague.241 The European Court’s jurisprudence, however, has displayed
reluctance in acknowledging vagueness in hate speech laws.242 Perhaps
because of the European Court’s approach to vagueness, litigants
frequently concede this issue.243 The African Court has interpreted the
African Convention as encompassing a requirement that laws must not be
improperly vague, though its hate speech jurisprudence is in too early a
phase to assess how rigorously it will apply this standard.244
With regard to the legitimacy test, both the U.N. and Inter-American
systems contain similar public interest objectives that can be invoked to
limit speech.245 Both systems also take the position that protecting religions
from criticism or protecting adherents of religions from offense are not
legitimate public interest objectives.246 The European Convention contains
a longer list of public interest objectives, and the European Court has
opined that the protection of religious sensibilities is an appropriate
objective for limiting speech.247 In addition, the U.N. human rights system
takes the position that speech that denies historic facts (when untethered to
incitement to particular harms) is permissible, whereas the European Court
has determined that the denial of certain historic atrocities is so grave that
such cases are outside the protection of the European Convention’s

237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

See supra notes 142-48.
See supra notes 150-58.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-41, 94-98, 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-45, 119 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-04, 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141, 172 and accompanying text.
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protection for freedom of expression.248 The African Court has recognized a
list of public interest objectives for limiting expression that is broader than
those set forth in ICCPR Article 19(3), but the African Declaration has
espoused a more restrictive view of legitimate public interest aims.249
The U.N. and Inter-American systems both assess if a speech
restriction is “necessary” by, among other things, evaluating if it (1) is the
least intrusive means to achieve the legitimate public interest objective, and
(2) is proportional to the aim to be achieved.250 Both the U.N. and InterAmerican systems have stressed the importance of using non-censorial
methods of tackling intolerance prior to resorting to speech bans.251 In
assessing the necessity of speech restrictions, the U.N. system has
emphasized the importance of governments demonstrating likely and
imminent harm252 as well as the need to display the speaker intended to
cause harm.253 The European Court does not apply a least intrusive means
test, but rather examines restrictions under a proportionality test and has
allowed speech bans where governments have not demonstrated likely or
imminent harm.254 In addition, whereas the U.N.’s proportionality test is
concerned with assessing if the infringement on the expression rights of the
speaker and of others is outweighed by the legitimate aim, the European
Court appears to allow for a more amorphous weighing of various rights
and interests.255 Early cases from the African Court have focused primarily
on proportionality rather than the least intrusive means test, though the
African Declaration has embraced both a “least restrictive means” test as
well as a proportionality assessment in determining if speech restrictions
are necessary.256
While the U.N.’s ICCPR (Article 20), ICERD (Article 4), and the
American Convention (Article 13.5), contain mandatory bans on certain
hate speech, the European Convention and African Charter do not contain
such bans (though the African Declaration did espouse a mandatory ban

248

See supra notes 99-102, 148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 196, 207 and accompanying text.
250
See supra notes 46-55, 124-25 and accompanying text.
251
See supra notes 52-53, 135-36 and accompanying text.
252
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
253
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
254
See supra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
255
See supra notes 54-55, 177-90 and accompanying text. See also David A. Kaye, Against
Balancing (May 4, 2020), https://dkisaway.medium.com/against-balancing-5ecc5dc2beb5 (explaining
the dangers of balancing freedom of expression against other rights rather than engaging in a strict
application of the legality, legitimacy, and necessity tests).
256
See supra notes 197, 208-10 and accompanying text.
249

208

20:165 (2022)

Convergence & Conflict

similar to ICCPR Article 20).257 Although the European Convention does
not contain a mandatory hate speech ban, the European Court appears to
apply lower thresholds for the prohibition of hate speech than the U.N. and
Inter-American systems.258 For example, the U.N. and Inter-American
systems both require that imposition of their mandatory hate speech bans
include a finding of specific intent to cause particular harm, and that such
harm be likely and imminent.259 However, the Inter-American Convention’s
ban covers a narrower range of harms than those set forth in ICCPR Article
20 or ICERD Article 4.260
This mapping exercise has not only illuminated key areas of
divergence in which regional systems provide fewer rights than the U.N.
system, but also revealed the potential for the European Court’s prolific
jurisprudence to (adversely) influence evolving jurisprudence in other
regions. For example, the African system has cited favorably to a variety
European Court views – including on the margin of appreciation, the test
for incitement, and the banning of atrocity denial261 – that improperly depart
from U.N. standards. Similarly, the OIC Human Rights Commission
invoked the European Court’s jurisprudence to justify its departure from
U.N. freedom of expression protections with respect to blasphemy, speech
that offends religious sensibilities, and expression that displays religious
intolerance.262
B. Recommendations for Human Rights Defenders
The fact that some regional human rights bodies – particularly in the
European system – are developing approaches that provide fewer
protections for freedom of expression does not throw into disarray the
substance of U.N. standards. Rather, countries violate their U.N. treaty
obligations when they provide fewer protections than their international
treaty obligations mandate.263 Such normative divergence between regional
and U.N. approaches can result in confusion with respect to international
standards and even facilitate challenging U.N. standards based on
257
See supra notes 56, 76, 127, 211 and accompanying text. The fact that the African Declaration
has espoused the approach of ICCPR Article 20 indicates a commitment to aligning with international
human rights standards.
258
See supra notes 56-92, 128-133, 184-190 and accompanying text.
259
See supra notes 56-92, 128-133 and accompanying text.
260
See supra notes 64-65, 84-85, 132-33 and accompanying text.
261
See, e.g., supra notes 198, 200-201, 212 and accompanying text (describing instances in which
the African system cited favorably to the European Court’s approach, which differs from U.N.
standards).
262
See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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arguments animated by cultural relativism.264 Though such arguments may
appear more principled because they are grounded in regional approaches,
they are contrary to international law and, if unaddressed, can set the stage
for erosion of U.N. minimum standards for the protection of freedom of
expression.
Human rights defenders should therefore be alert to the potential for
misuse of regional norms to weaken, or avoid implementation of, U.N.
standards in a variety of settings. For example, governments may
improperly invoke regional norms – particularly those derived from the
European Court’s jurisprudence – to define the full scope of their
international obligations in developing national legislation or defending
existing laws before domestic and regional courts. In addition, countries are
likely to continue invoking regional approaches to rationalize their U.N.
treaty violations when questioned by U.N. monitors 265 and when developing
regional human rights instruments and interpretations.266 Moreover,
governments will likely seek ways to modify universal norms by codifying
regional approaches in relevant state-adopted U.N. human rights
instruments267 as well as in their efforts to influence U.N. expert
interpretations on the scope of ICCPR obligations.268
To the extent that human rights defenders face arguments in various
fora that adhering to U.N. standards is problematic because they
“disregard” the cultural and local conditions embodied in regional
approaches, human rights defenders should raise two arguments. First, the
U.N.’s legality, legitimacy, and necessity conditions do not force the
homogenization of all speech laws. Rather the three-part test is a safety
check to ensure that individuals are not being judged under laws that do not
give appropriate notice (legality), that laws are imposed for important
public interest purposes (legitimacy), and that governments do not use
hammers to regulate speech when tweezers are sufficient (necessity).
264

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing Germany’s response to a U.N.
inquiry by invoking the European Court’s approach to hate speech to justify its NetzDG law).
266
See, e.g., supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (highlighting how the OIC’s Human Rights
Commission invoked the European Court’s jurisprudence to justify the OIC Declaration’s departure
from U.N. standards on speech that offends religious sensibilities).
267
See, e.g., Nossel, supra note 225, at 10-11 (describing the OIC’s effort during a decade at the
United Nations to develop norms that commemorated its views on blasphemy).
268
For example, when the Human Rights Committee requested comments on its draft General
Comment on freedom of assembly, Germany submitted recommendations to restrict the interpretations
in the draft by citing to European Court cases. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Call for Comment:
No. 37 on Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Right of Peaceful
Assembly, OHCHR (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GCArticle21.
aspx (click “Inputs Received” dropdown, then select “Germany”).
265
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Second, the U.N. approach does in fact require a robust examination of
local conditions and context in order to assess the validity of speech
restrictions.269 It is impossible to examine whether a restriction constitutes
the least intrusive means or is proportional without understanding the local
context. Similarly, it is not feasible to assess a speaker’s intent or whether
speech could lead to incitement to imminent and likely harm without
understanding local context.
In order to counter misuse of regional norms to redefine (and weaken)
U.N. standards in various fora, human rights defenders should remain
vigilant with respect to (1) improper lessening or removal of governmental
burdens to demonstrate the validity of speech restrictions, (2) applications
of watered-down versions of the U.N.’s legality, legitimacy, and necessity
conditions, and (3) neglect of the high thresholds contained in the U.N.’s
mandatory speech bans. For instance, if governments claim they are
entitled to a margin of appreciation when restricting speech, or assert that
certain speech falls outside the protection of human rights law, human
rights defenders should make clear that such regional notions directly
conflict with existing U.N. standards.270
With respect to the legality, legitimacy, and necessity conditions,
human rights defenders should advocate for implementation of U.N.
standards relating to this three-part test and not acquiesce to regional
institutions’ different (and weaker) versions of these three conditions.
Whether assessing draft legislation or arguing in a variety of court settings,
human rights defenders should hold governments to the U.N.’s rigorous
regime for assessing vagueness of prohibitions rather than accept, for
example, the European system’s high tolerance for vague prohibitions.271 In
their advocacy, human rights defenders should also argue for the U.N.’s
restrictive view of legitimate public interest objectives (which do not
include protection from religious offense or denial of historic facts).272
Moreover, human rights defenders should insist that governments
demonstrate that their speech restrictions meet the U.N. necessity test’s
least intrusive means analysis as well as its proportionality examination,
rather than going along with the European Court’s amorphous
proportionality test.273 In sum, while the “name” of the three-part test is the
same across the U.N. and regional systems (i.e., the legality, legitimacy,
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See, e.g., supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text (describing how U.N. standards on hate
speech and freedom of expression are tied to a contextual analysis).
270
See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
272
See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
273
See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
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and necessity test), the substantive content that is applied can differ, and
human rights defenders should consistently argue for application of the
U.N.’s version of each prong of the test.
When governments seek to justify laws based on the mandatory bans
in ICCPR Article 20 and/or ICERD Article 4, human rights defenders
should proactively remind governments and adjudicators that such laws
must not only survive scrutiny under ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test,
but also respect the strict thresholds delineated by U.N. experts. 274 First,
specific intent on the part of the speaker to incite harm must be
demonstrated.275 Negligence or reckless disregard for potential harm are not
sufficient to rise to the level of “advocacy” by a speaker. Second, the
potential harm must not be speculative, but rather, the imminence and
likelihood of the harm are key aspects to the U.N.’s assessment of
“incitement.”276 As cautioned by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression, mere “advocacy of hatred on the basis of national, racial or
religious grounds is not an offence in itself.”277
With regard to the particular harms that are embodied in the U.N.’s
mandatory hate speech bans, human rights defenders should advocate for
use of definitions proposed by U.N. experts. While ICCPR Article 20’s
harms of “discrimination” and “violence” may be well understood,
“hostility” can pose interpretative issues due to its ambiguity and potential
breadth. Because of this, human rights defenders should emphasize to
states that they should interpret “hostility” in ICCPR Article 20 to require
“a manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind,”278 which can
reasonably be understood to include lawless acts such as trespass and
vandalism. A manifestation of hatred could also take the form of what the
U.S. legal system calls a “true threat,” which “encompass[es] those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.”279
While remaining attentive to misuse of regional norms to justify
departures from (and the potential weakening of) U.N. standards, human
rights defenders should also emphasize the importance of implementing
274

See supra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61, 80 and accompanying text.
276
See supra notes 62, 82-83 and accompanying text.
277
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶ 43. Unfortunately, regional
approaches have at times departed from such thresholds. See, e.g., supra notes 198, 232 and
accompanying text (noting instances when the African and OIC mechanisms have cited favorably to
ECtHR approval of bans on mere “incitement to hatred” or “advocacy of hatred”).
278
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report to UNGA, supra note 60, ¶ 44(e).
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Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
275

212

20:165 (2022)

Convergence & Conflict

U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18, which affirmed that
governments should seek to engage in a wide variety of good governance
measures to tackle hate and intolerance before resorting to speech bans.280
Countries that do not engage in such good governance are not to be
rewarded with wide censorial powers as an initial approach to tackling hate
and intolerance.281 Often this hard work of deploying effective measures to
tackle hate and intolerance is ignored, with the debate around hate speech
focusing solely on banning speech as the means to tackle hate speech.
Focusing exclusively on speech restrictions is inconsistent with the due
diligence governments and courts should undertake in verifying that
governments are implementing the least intrusive means of tackling hate.
Human rights defenders should also seek to engage with the Arab
League, ASEAN, and the OIC to positively influence the problematic
trajectory of normative developments in such fora. Within the last thirty
years, each of these emerging approaches was formed by groups of states
that included many who were bound by the ICCPR and yet which agreed to
norms that, on their face, depart significantly from U.N. standards. For
example, in 2020, the OIC – the second largest intergovernmental
organization after the U.N. – adopted an updated Cairo Declaration that
omitted key protections for freedom of expression and its human rights
commission explicitly relied on European Court jurisprudence to justify its
departure from U.N. standards.282 Engaging with these newer mechanisms
should be part of human rights defenders’ strategies for preserving the
U.N.’s minimum standards on freedom of expression.
Finally, the divergence between U.N. and regional standards is
relevant to the work of human rights defenders, given that private
companies are seeking to align their platforms’ corporate speech rules with
international human rights norms. Indeed, the world’s leading business and
human rights framework – the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs) – calls on companies to align their operations with
U.N. human rights standards.283 Some companies – such as Twitter and
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See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
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Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, ¶ 1 (July 6, 2011); see also
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Rep. of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). UNGP
Principle 12 defines “internationally recognized human rights” as including at a minimum the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and two foundational U.N. treaties (including the ICCPR) as well as an
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Facebook – have adopted policies that state that they look to the ICCPR
and regional treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights. 284
Such statements of policy should cause human rights defenders to raise a
variety of questions in their engagement with online platforms that seek to
align with the UNGPs. First, are the companies aware of the areas of
conflict between the ICCPR and European approaches to freedom of
expression and hate speech? If so, how are they applying different bodies
of standards when there are evident areas of conflict? In other words, are
they applying the U.N.’s approach on vagueness or that of the European
Court? Are they applying the least intrusive means test or disregarding it,
as does the European Court? Second, on what principled basis are
companies selecting to elevate one region’s human rights instrument and
disregarding those of other sub-global systems (or are they citing European
instruments to appease active regulators)?285 Are the companies applying
European standards to individuals in other regions? If so, what would be
the principled basis for doing so? In sum, human rights defenders should
urge private platforms seeking to implement the UNGPs to understand the
areas of convergence and conflict between U.N. and regional human rights
systems, and to align with the U.N.’s minimum standards for the protection
of expression.
CONCLUSION
This Article has illuminated two countervailing and under-reported
trends: on the one hand, a growing consensus among U.N. experts and
treaty bodies concerning interpretations of hate speech prohibitions in
international law; and on the other, a failure of several regional human
rights bodies to develop approaches to hate speech that are consistent with
International Labor Organization declaration. Id. at 13. The Commentary for Principle 12 notes other
U.N. human rights instruments may also be consulted. Id. at 14.
284
Twitter’s policies provide that its respect for freedom of expression is “grounded” in U.S.
domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights and “informed” by the UNGPs.
Defending and Respecting the Rights of People Using Our Service, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/
en/rules-and-policies/defending-and-respecting-our-users-voice. Facebook’s Corporate Human Rights
Policy provides that, in seeking to respect human rights as provided for in the UNGPs, the company
will turn to not only U.N. human rights instruments but also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and the American Convention. FACEBOOK, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY,
supra note 8.
285
In the last few years, Europe has been actively seeking ways to regulate online hate speech. See
David Kaye, How Europe’s New Internet Laws Threaten Freedom of Expression: Recent Regulation
Risk Censoring Legitimate Content, FOREIGN AFFS. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/europe/2017-12-18/how-europes-new-internet-laws-threaten-freedom-expression (describing a
“wave” of European regulation affecting platforms and online speech). It may be that companies are
citing to European human rights standards in an attempt to curry favor with European Union and
national regulators. See id.
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the U.N.’s universal standards. The U.N.’s approach requires that
governments bear the burden of demonstrating that all speech restrictions
pass the principled (and rigorously applied) test of legality, legitimacy, and
necessity. In addition, the U.N.’s mandatory hate speech bans require
establishing the speaker’s specific intent and assessing whether harm is
likely and imminent. While some regional approaches converge with the
U.N.’s approach to freedom of expression and hate speech, others conflict
by providing fewer protections for freedom of expression. Specifically,
certain regional approaches (1) lessen the burden on governments to justify
speech restrictions, (2) do not rigorously assess the vagueness of hate
speech laws, (3) approve of illegitimate public interest objectives for
restricting speech, and/or (4) neglect the least intrusive means test or
provide a weaker proportionality test. The European system’s divergence
from U.N. norms is particularly noteworthy given its abundant
jurisprudence and potential to affect the development of other regional
approaches. To promote the convergence of regional systems and national
laws with the U.N.’s approach to hate speech, human rights defenders
across the globe should prioritize tackling this troubling trend of norm
divergence to preserve universal minimum protections for freedom of
expression.
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